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I. INTRODUCTION
Every year, hundreds of thousands of children are exposed
to harmful pesticides, resulting in acute injury and even death,
and contributing to longer-term chronic diseases and
disabilities, which can include neurological disorders,
reproductive problems, developmental delays, and cancer.1
Until recently, however, the United States had nothing in its
pesticide laws that addressed issues specific to children’s
health, and very little data was available regarding the unique
impacts of pesticides on children. In 1996, Congress passed the
Food Quality Protection Act of 1996 (FQPA),2 which directs the
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to apply a
presumptive, additional tenfold margin of safety in setting
pesticide residue tolerances on food to take into account toxicity
and exposure of pesticides to infants and children. This law,
arguably the first environmental law to require that issues
specific to children’s health be considered in setting
environmental risk standards, resulted in a flurry of scholarly
writing, ranging from hope to skepticism, as the scientific and
regulatory aspects of the law were debated.3
1. JOHN WARGO, OUR CHILDREN’S TOXIC LEGACY: HOW SCIENCE AND
LAW FAIL TO PROTECT US FROM PESTICIDES 178 (1996) (stating that
“[b]etween 1 and 3 million people, many of them children, are poisoned by
pesticides in the world each year, and at least 168 different pesticide
compounds are known to have caused significant human illness or death”);
Bruce P. Lanphear, Charles V. Vorhees & David C. Bellinger, Protecting
Children from Environmental Toxins: Toxicity Testing of Pesticides and
Industrial Chemicals Is a Crucial Step, 2 PLOS MEDICINE 203, 203-04 (2005),
available
at
http://medicine.plosjournals.org/archive/15491676/2/3/pdf/10.1371_journal.pmed.0020061-L.pdf.
2. Pub. L. No. 104-170, 110 Stat. 1489 (1996).
3. See, e.g., Frank B. Cross, The Consequences of Consensus: Dangerous
Compromises of the Food Quality Protection Act, 75 WASH. U. L.Q. 1155 (1997)
(arguing that FQPA continues overregulation of pesticide residues on food);
Keith Cunningham-Parmeter, A Poisoned Field: Farmworkers, Pesticide
Exposure, and Tort Recovery in an Era of Regulatory Failure, 28 N.Y.U. REV.
L. & SOC. CHANGE 431 (2003) (analyzing the administrative state’s failure to
protect farmworkers from pesticides and how tort actions can catalyze
improved field protections while compensating victims); Steven Geoffrey
Gieseler, On a Viable and Effective Future for the Food Quality Protection Act,
9 ALB. L. ENVTL. OUTLOOK 345 (2004) (detailing history of FQPA and current
scientific methodology under the law and providing suggestions to improve the
law’s implementation); Thomas O. McGarity, Politics by Other Means: Law,
Science, and Policy in EPA’s Implementation of the Food Quality Protection
Act, 53 ADMIN. L. REV. 103 (2001) (discussing science and policy issues
necessary to implement the FQPA’s focus on risks to children and reasons why
EPA has been unable to fulfill the law’s mandates); Linda-Jo Schierow,
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Nearly ten years later, however, much of the law’s promise
remains unfulfilled as EPA has often failed to set pesticide
tolerances with margins of safety that are sufficiently
protective of children and failed to require manufacturers to
conduct adequate tests to determine specific impacts of
pesticides on children.4 The purpose of this Article is to explore
the extent to which state common law tort claims can act as a
gap-filler to increase protection for children from harmful
pesticides. Unlike a state or federal agency, which can delay
action on a legal or technical issue for years as a result of
scarce resources, limited data, alternate priorities, or political
pressure, judges must decide the cases before them based on
the available evidence within a discrete (and relatively short)
Pesticide Residue Regulation: Analysis of Food Quality Protection Act
Implementation, 10 RISK 281 (1999) (evaluating the status of FQPA
implementation and concluding that EPA is making progress but contentious
implementation issues remain unresolved); James Smart, All the Stars in the
Heavens Were in the Right Places: The Passage of the Food Quality Protection
Act of 1996, 17 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 273 (1998) (detailing history of passage of
FQPA); Valerie Watnick, Risk Assessment: Obfuscation of Policy Decisions in
Pesticide Regulation and the EPA’s Dismantling of the Food Quality Protection
Act’s Safeguards for Children, 31 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1315 (1999) (arguing that EPA
has failed to implement many of the FQPA’s protections for children); Scott
Douglas Bauer, Note, The Food Quality Protection Act of 1996: Replacing Old
Impracticalities with New Uncertainties in Pesticide Regulation, 75 N.C. L.
REV. 1369 (1997) (discussing uncertainties involved in assessing risk and
benefits under FQPA); Andrew J. Miller, Note, The Food Quality Protection
Act of 1996: Science and Law at a Crossroads, 7 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F.
393 (1997) (describing difficult task for EPA in utilizing science to set new
pesticide risk assessments); Jennifer C. Miner, Comment, Do Environmental
Laws Adequately Protect Children’s Environmental Health? A Review of
Existing Laws, Potential Legislation and Policy Considerations, 78 OR. L. REV.
1101 (1999) (evaluating children’s special environmental vulnerabilities and
current and potential laws to address them); Michael Schon, Comment,
Susceptible Children: Why the EPA’s New Risk Assessment Guidelines for
Children Fail to Protect America’s Future, 36 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 701 (2004)
(arguing that EPA’s risk assessment guidelines do not sufficiently protect
children).
4. See, e.g., DAVID WALLINGA, NATURAL RES. DEF. COUNCIL, PUTTING
CHILDREN FIRST: MAKING PESTICIDE LEVELS IN FOOD SAFER FOR INFANTS AND
CHILDREN 61-62 (1998) (discussing EPA failure to require data on
neurotoxicity risks in pesticide registration process despite availability of
validated testing protocols); Watnick, supra note 3, at 1341-43 (stating how
EPA has failed to review the riskiest pesticide tolerances under the FQPA by
the statutory deadline, has not routinely or consistently applied the tenfold
safety factor to protect children in setting pesticide tolerances, and has not
required pesticide registrants to test for a broad range of toxic effects in adults
or children); Schon, supra note 3, at 720-23 (arguing that EPA guidelines for
assessing cancer risks to children from pesticides do not fulfill the child
protection mandates in the FQPA).
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period of time. This Article concludes that the Supreme Court’s
2005 decision in Bates v. Dow Agrosciences LLC,5 which
significantly limits the scope of federal preemption of common
law tort claims against pesticide manufacturers, creates a
significant opportunity for such claims to play an increasing
role in pesticide policy with regard to children’s health. Such
claims can do so by spurring the collection and effective use of
scientific data in this area.
In order to realize this opportunity, this Article proposes
that courts apply a modified scientific evidence standard and
then shift the burden of proof to pesticide manufacturer
defendants in cases in which the plaintiff can establish that the
defendant failed to conduct reasonably available testing to
gather currently unavailable scientific evidence on the issue of
causation. This Article posits that such a modification of
current evidentiary standards under the common law can be
justified not only on the precautionary principle inherent in the
FQPA itself, but on the power of common law courts to shape
tort law to reflect the complexities of risk in today’s society.
Section II of this Article presents a brief summary of
federal pesticide law and the enactment of the FQPA. Section
III evaluates cases involving pesticides and children’s health in
the context of claims against EPA and other regulatory
agencies, as well as claims against pesticide manufacturers and
sprayers. Section IV explains why the Supreme Court’s recent
decision in Bates makes lawsuits against manufacturers based
on negligent testing and negligent design theories an
increasingly powerful tool in spurring manufacturers to gather
scientific data and provide additional protections for children.
Moreover, this Section proposes that courts look to the
precautionary principle embodied in the FQPA, and rely on
their inherent powers to shape tort law, to modify the
evidentiary burden for plaintiffs in pesticide cases where
scientific uncertainty reasonably attributable to manufacturers
would otherwise pose a virtually insurmountable barrier to
relief.
II. PESTICIDE REGULATION FROM FIFRA TO FQPA
In 2000 and 2001, nearly five billion pounds of pesticides
were used annually in the United States on homes, farms,

5. 125 S. Ct. 1788 (2005).
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Despite the
gardens and for industrial applications.6
widespread use of pesticides in nearly every sector of society,
there is increasingly strong evidence that pesticides have had
and continue to have adverse and pervasive effects on human
health and the environment. Rachel Carson’s 1962 book, Silent
Spring,7 along with targeted lawsuits to ban the pesticide
DDT,8 played a significant role9 in prompting Congress to
overhaul the existing federal pesticide law through the 1972
Amendments to the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide and
6. TIMOTHY KIELY, DAVID DONALDSON & ARTHUR GRUBE, U.S. ENVTL.
PROT. AGENCY, PESTICIDES INDUSTRY SALES AND USAGE: 2000 AND 2001
MARKET ESTIMATES 10 (2004).
7. RACHEL CARSON, SILENT SPRING (1962).
8. See Marshall Lee Miller, Pesticides, in ENVIRONMENTAL LAW
HANDBOOK 645, 647 (Gov’t Inst. 17th ed. 2003); see also Environmental Def.
Fund v. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 489 F.2d 1247 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (dismissing action
challenging EPA’s suspension of DDT use); Environmental Def. Fund v. Envtl.
Prot. Agency, 465 F.2d 528 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (remanding EPA decision not to
suspend aldrin and dieldrin for consideration of additional scientific evidence);
Environmental Def. Fund v. Ruckelshaus, 439 F.2d 584 (D.C. Cir. 1971)
(requiring EPA Administrator to commence administrative proceedings to
determine whether DDT registration should be canceled in the face of evidence
concerning safety); Environmental Def. Fund v. Hardin, 428 F.2d 1093 (D.C.
Cir. 1970) (holding environmental groups had standing to challenge Secretary
of Agriculture’s failure to take prompt action on request for DDT suspension);
Environmental Def. Fund v. United States Dep’t of Health, Educ. & Welfare,
428 F.2d 1083 (D.C. Cir. 1970) (holding action on petitioners’ proposal to
establish zero tolerance level for DDT residues on raw agricultural
commodities did not have to await action by Department of Agriculture);
THOMAS R. DUNLAP, DDT: SCIENTISTS, CITIZENS, AND PUBLIC POLICY 231-38
(1981) (discussing lawsuits); WARGO, supra note 1, at 87-88 (same); Andrew P.
Morriss & Roger E. Meiners, Property Rights, Pesticides, and Public Health:
Explaining the Paradox of Modern Pesticide Policy, 14 FORDHAM ENVTL. L.J.
1, 24-25 (2002) (detailing lawsuits against the Department of Agriculture and
EPA).
9. See CHRISTOPHER J. BOSSO, PESTICIDES AND POLITICS: THE LIFE
CYCLE OF A PUBLIC ISSUE 154-58 (1987) (recounting litigation and policy
battles over DDT); DUNLAP, supra note 8, at 129-245 (same); Angus A.
MacIntyre, Why Pesticides Received Extensive Use in America: A Political
Economy of Agricultural Pest Management to 1970, 27 NAT. RESOURCES J.
533, 572-73 (1987) (detailing political, social, and legal activities leading up to
the banning of DDT); Toward a Noisier Spring: D.C. Circuit Upholds
Cancellation of DDT Registrations, 4 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. Law Inst.) 10,013
(1974) (detailing litigation and political fight leading up to decision by the D.C.
Circuit Court of Appeals affirming EPA’s cancellation of DDT). By the late
1960s, estimates were that one billion pounds of DDT were circulating
throughout the world’s air and water; traces of DDT were found in birds and
wildlife from Antarctica to the mid-Pacific Ocean, as well as in the body
tissues and food supply of humans throughout the world. 3 WILLIAM H.
RODGERS, JR., ENVIRONMENTAL LAW: PESTICIDES AND TOXIC SUBSTANCES §
5.1, at 12 (1988).
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Rodenticide Act (FIFRA).10
A. FIFRA AND COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS
FIFRA’s primary provisions create and administer a
federal, uniform system of registering pesticides. A pesticide
cannot be distributed, sold, or used until it is registered and
approved by EPA.11 The EPA Administrator approves the
registration based on its composition, labeling, and whether “it
will perform its intended function without unreasonable
FIFRA defines
adverse effects on the environment.”12
“unreasonable adverse effects on the environment” as “any
unreasonable risk to man or the environment, taking into
account the economic, social, and environmental costs and
benefits of the use of any pesticide.”13
Thus, EPA’s major policy function under FIFRA is to
balance the pesticide’s risks to human health and the
environment against the potential benefits flowing from its
use.14 As a result, cost-benefit analysis is a central part of
FIFRA’s regulatory framework.15 Although FIFRA provides for
civil and criminal penalties for violation of the law’s
requirements,16 it does not contain a private right of action.17
10. Pub. L. No. 92-516, 86 Stat. 973 (1972) (codified at 7 U.S.C. §§ 136136y (2000)). For judicial treatment of FIFRA’s evolution, see, for example,
Wisconsin Pub. Intervenor v. Mortier, 501 U.S. 597, 601-02 (1991); and
Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 992 (1984).
11. See 7 U.S.C. § 136a(a) (2000). For a more detailed description of
federal pesticide regulation, see Alexandra B. Klass, Bees, Trees, Preemption
and Nuisance: A New Path to Resolving Pesticide Land Use Disputes, 32
ECOLOGY L.Q. (forthcoming 2005).
12. 7 U.S.C. § 136a(c)(5).
13. 7 U.S.C. § 136(bb) (2000).
14. See Miller, supra note 8, at 653.
15. See, e.g., Washington Toxics Coal. v. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 413 F.3d
1024, 1032 (9th Cir. 2005) (stating that “FIFRA’s objective is to protect human
health and prevent environmental harm from pesticides through a cost-benefit
analysis of the pesticides”); Headwaters, Inc. v. Talent Irrigation Dist., 243
F.3d 526, 532 (9th Cir. 2001) (stating that “FIFRA registration is a costbenefit analysis that no unreasonable risk exists to man or the environment”
weighing the economic, social, and environmental costs and benefits of the
pesticide use (citing Save Our Ecosystems v. Clark, 747 F.2d 1240, 1248 (9th
Cir. 1984))); see also DANIEL A. FARBER, ECO-PRAGMATISM: MAKING SENSIBLE
ENVIRONMENTAL DECISIONS IN AN UNCERTAIN WORLD 103 & n.16 (1999)
(describing FIFRA as one of the only federal environmental statutes that
provides for open-ended cost-benefit analysis as opposed to the vast majority of
other environmental statutes that establish a “pro-environmental baseline”).
16. See 7 U.S.C. § 136l(a), (b) (2000).
17. See, e.g., Bates v. Dow Agrosciences, LLC, 125 S. Ct. 1788, 1801 (2005)
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This omission compromises optimal enforcement of federal
pesticide law through private attorney general suits and limits
the law’s ability to provide compensation for damages and deter
improper pesticide registration and use.
While FIFRA allows states to regulate the sale or use of
any federally registered pesticide,18 it prohibits state
involvement in pesticide labeling.
In a section entitled
“Uniformity,” FIFRA provides that a state “shall not impose or
continue in effect any requirements for labeling or packaging in
addition to or different from those required under this
subchapter.”19 The question of which state actions (whether
actions by state agencies, jury verdicts, or judicial decisions)
are (or should be) subject to federal preemption under this
provision is significant in creating the boundaries within which
litigants may use the courts to spur policy changes and data
gathering through common law claims for damages arising
from pesticides.
B. THE FQPA AND THE PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE
The FQPA of 1996 represents the most recent iteration of
Congress’s efforts to reconcile regulation of pesticides and
control of pesticide residues on food. In doing so, the FQPA
also created one of the first environmental laws that
specifically addressed the needs of children. Before turning to
the child-specific provisions of the law, the history leading up to
the enactment of the FQPA helps place the law in its
appropriate context.
As detailed above, all pesticides are registered and
regulated under FIFRA as administered by the EPA. However,
EPA regulates allowable levels of pesticide residues on food
under a separate law—the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic
(noting that FIFRA does not provide a federal remedy for persons injured as a
result of a manufacturer’s violation of FIFRA’s labeling requirements); No
Spray Coalition, Inc. v. City of New York, 351 F.3d 602, 605 (2d Cir. 2003)
(discussing absence of private right of action in FIFRA).
18. 7 U.S.C. § 136v(a) (2000).
19. 7 U.S.C. § 136v(b). By contrast, states may impose additional
requirements relating to the sale or use of pesticides. See, e.g., National Bank
of Commerce v. Dow Chem. Co., 165 F.3d 602, 608 (8th Cir. 1999) (stating that
FIFRA strikes a balance between state and federal control and “leaves ample
room” for state regulation (citing Wisconsin Pub. Intervenor v. Mortier, 501
U.S. 597, 613 (1991))); Lowe v. Sporicidin Int’l, 47 F.3d 124, 128 (4th Cir.
1995) (holding that while FIFRA preempts a state’s imposition of additional
labeling requirements, “it does not preempt a state’s authority to monitor
compliance with labeling or other requirements imposed by FIFRA”).
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Act (FFDCA).20 Under the FFDCA, EPA is responsible for
setting the maximum allowable safe levels of a substance in or
on a food (called a “tolerance”) while the U.S. Food and Drug
Administration (FDA) and the U.S. Department of Agriculture
(USDA) are responsible for enforcing those tolerances.21 Under
FIFRA, EPA will not register a pesticide until the applicant has
obtained the necessary tolerances or exemptions in accordance
with the FFDCA.22
The Food Quality Protection Act of 1996 came about in
large part as a compromise to address the so-called “Delaney
Paradox,” created by the Delaney Amendment to the FFDCA,
which set a zero tolerance for carcinogenic pesticides in
processed foods.23 The “paradox” resulted because in effect the
law prohibited any carcinogenic substance in processed foods,
even if it posed only a de minimis risk, while allowing the same
substance to be present in raw foods.24
The FQPA repealed the Delaney clause and contains, for
the first time, provisions specifically designed to protect the
health of infants and children.25 This new focus on the impacts
of pesticides on infants and children was more than justified
and deserves attention.
In 1993, after several years of study, the National Academy
of Sciences (NAS) released a report entitled Pesticides in the
Diets of Infants and Children,26 on the subject of whether
pesticides posed special risks to children because of heavier
exposure and greater susceptibility to the toxic effects of such

20. 21 U.S.C. §§ 301-395 (2000).
21. See Miller, supra note 8, at 697-98.
22. See 40 C.F.R. § 152.112(g) (2004); Linda J. Fisher et al., A
Practitioner’s Guide to the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act:
Part III, 24 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. Law Inst.) 10,629, 10,646 (1994). The EPA
Administrator has authority under section 408 of the FFDCA to issue
“exemptions” for pesticides for which a tolerance is unnecessary to protect
public health. See Miller, supra note 8, at 697-98.
23. Compare 21 U.S.C. § 348(c)(3)(A) (1994) (setting “zero tolerance”
standard for carcinogenic pesticides in processed foods), and 21 U.S.C. §
346a(b)(2)(A)(ii) (2000) (defining “safe” with respect to a tolerance for a
pesticide chemical residue), with Fisher et al., supra note 22, at 10,648-49,
Miller, supra note 8, at 693-95, and RODGERS, supra note 9, § 5.22, at 282-88.
24. See Watnick, supra note 3, at 1324-26.
25. See id. at 1329-31.
26. COMMITTEE ON PESTICIDES IN THE DIETS OF INFANTS AND CHILDREN,
NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, PESTICIDES IN THE DIETS OF INFANTS AND
CHILDREN (1993).
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chemicals.27 The NAS study, along with subsequent research,
supports the conclusion that infants and children are indeed
more vulnerable to health damage from pesticides. This is
because the dietary diversity of children is extremely low and
they are more vulnerable to the effects of toxic chemicals as
their cells and organs develop. Also, pound for pound, children
breathe, eat, and drink more than adults, and engage in
activities closer to the ground where pesticide residues in air,
dirt, and on floors are often the greatest.28
However, the NAS study concluded that insufficient data
on children’s food consumption and pesticide toxicity prevented
them from determining a precise level of increased risk to
children posed by pesticides.29 The NAS study’s authors
recommended that an additional child-specific uncertainty
factor be used routinely in setting pesticide tolerances
whenever toxicity data was incomplete to account for potential
vulnerability in children.30 It was these and other findings that
led to several key provisions of the FQPA.31
The FQPA requires EPA to quantitatively assess the risks
of a pesticide residue and the potential for aggregate exposure
and use an additional tenfold margin of safety when setting
pesticide tolerances unless reliable data suggests some other
margin will be safe for infants and children.32 As EPA
27. See id. at 267-363; WARGO, supra note 1, at 10-11.
28. See NATURAL RES. DEF. COUNCIL, TROUBLE ON THE FARM: GROWING
UP WITH PESTICIDES IN AGRICULTURAL COMMUNITIES, ch. 2 (1998),
http://www.nrdc.org/health/kids/farm/farminx.asp; WALLINGA, supra note 4, at
1; WARGO, supra note 1, at 10-13; Denise Koch et al., Temporal Association of
Children’s Pesticide Exposure and Agricultural Spraying: Report of a
Longitudinal Biological Monitoring Study, 110 ENVTL. HEALTH PERSP. 829,
829 (2002) (stating that children may be more susceptible to the effects of
pesticides than adults and finding that pesticide spraying in agricultural
regions can increase children’s exposure in the absence of parental work
contact with pesticides or residential proximity to pesticide-treated farmland),
available
at
http://ehp.niehs.nih.gov/members/2002/110p829833koch/EHP110p829PDF.PDF; Lanphear, supra note 1, at 203-04.
29. See COMMITTEE ON PESTICIDES IN THE DIETS OF INFANTS AND
CHILDREN, supra note 26, at 360-63; WARGO, supra note 1, at 12.
30. COMMITTEE ON PESTICIDES IN THE DIETS OF INFANTS AND CHILDREN,
supra note 26, at 361.
31. See Watnick, supra note 3, at 1324-32 (detailing legislative history of
FQPA).
32. See 21 U.S.C. § 346a(b)(vi) (2000); Watnick, supra note 3, at 1342
(citing OFFICE OF PREVENTION, EPA, 10X SAFETY FACTOR SHEET, PESTICIDES
AND TOXIC SUBSTANCES 1 (1999)); U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, FACT SHEET:
PROTECTING
CHILDREN
FROM
PESTICIDES
(Jan.
2002),
http://www.epa.gov/pesticides/factsheets/kidpesticide.htm (discussing FQPA’s
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generally uses a hundred-fold margin of safety, this results in
potentially multiplying that margin by an additional factor of
ten when there is evidence of developmental toxicity or when
exposure data is incomplete.33 Moreover, in assessing the risk
of the pesticide chemical residue, the FQPA directs EPA to
consider: (1) information about consumption patterns of infants
and children that are likely to result in disproportionately high
consumption of foods containing pesticide residues in
comparison to the general population, (2) special susceptibility
of infants and children to pesticide residues, (3) information
concerning cumulative effects on infants and children of
substances that have a common mechanism of toxicity, (4)
information to ensure a reasonable certainty of no harm to
infants and children from aggregate exposure to pesticide
residues, and (5) other relevant factors relating to data,
toxicity, dietary consumption patterns, and information
“concerning the variability of the sensitivities of major
identifiable subgroups of consumers.”34
If nothing else, the FQPA is significant in that it is one of
the only examples of environmental legislation that contains
specific provisions for the protection of infants and children.35
requirement of an additional safety factor for children in setting pesticide
residue standards).
33. See Watnick, supra note 3, at 1339. For a discussion of the tenfold
safety factors, see OFFICE OF PESTICIDE PROGRAMS, U.S. ENVTL. PROT.
AGENCY, DETERMINATION OF THE APPROPRIATE FQPA SAFETY FACTOR(S) IN
TOLERANCE ASSESSMENT A-3 (Feb. 2002). Some argue that EPA policy
documents and practice have reversed the burden of proof in some instances
and failed to impose one or more of the safety factors in the face of data
uncertainty.
See Natural Res. Def. Council, Re: Draft Science Policy
Document, “Consideration of the FQPA Safety Factor and Other Uncertainty
Factors in Cumulative Risk Assessment of Chemicals Sharing a Common
Mechanism of Toxicity,” Docket No. OPP-00759 (April 29, 2002) at 3-4
[hereinafter NRDC Comments]; see also OFFICE OF PESTICIDE PROGRAMS, U.S.
ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, CONSIDERATION OF THE FQPA SAFETY FACTOR AND
OTHER UNCERTAINTY FACTORS IN CUMULATIVE RISK ASSESSMENT OF
CHEMICALS SHARING A COMMON MECHANISM OF TOXICITY 10 (Draft, Feb. 28,
2002) (stating that the absence of data on common mechanism toxicity does
not automatically warrant the application of an uncertainty or safety factor,
but that risk assessors should evaluate the overall value of the missing study);
WALLINGA, supra note 4, at 42 (stating that EPA typically has not imposed the
FQPA safety factor in setting pesticide tolerances and questioning what the
EPA considers “reliable data” to justify departure from the presumptive safety
factor).
34. See 21 U.S.C. § 346a(b)(2)(C)-(D) (2000).
35. See David E. Adelman, The False Promise of the Genomics Revolution
for Environmental Law, 29 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 117, 138 (2005) (noting that
“[t]he FQPA is arguably the first environmental statute that addresses
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Moreover, the law’s provisions relating to children rely much
more heavily on the “precautionary principle” than cost-benefit
analysis. The precautionary principle is an approach to
regulation, used widely today in European nations, which
states that if an activity might threaten human health or the
environment, precautionary measures should be taken even if
some of the cause-and-effect relationships are not fully
established scientifically.36
By contrast, under a cost-benefit analysis, the potential
risks of an activity are merely weighed against the potential
benefits, and as long as the latter are greater than the former,
the activity should be allowed. While cost-benefit analysis is
central to the determination of whether to register a pesticide
under FIFRA, the FQPA creates an overlay requiring increased
margins of safety in order to protect children’s health, even in
the absence of data showing a causal relationship between the
pesticide and harm to children’s health.37 As a result, the
FQPA, based on the findings of the NAS study, promotes the
precautionary principle over traditional cost-benefit analysis
used to register pesticides generally under FIFRA.38
population-wide variation in toxic susceptibilities” in its focus on infants and
children).
36. See CASS R. SUNSTEIN, LAWS OF FEAR: BEYOND THE PRECAUTIONARY
PRINCIPLE 13-20 (2005) (describing the precautionary principle and arguing
that it is incoherent and can lead to paralysis, but that applying a refined
version of the precautionary principle in cases where the risk of catastrophic
damage exists makes sense); see also FARBER, supra note 15, at 6-7, 170-71;
CASS R. SUNSTEIN, THE COST-BENEFIT STATE: THE FUTURE OF REGULATORY
PROTECTION 6-10, 23-24 (2002); Frank Ackerman & Lisa Heinzerling, Pricing
the Priceless: Cost-Benefit Analysis of Environmental Protection, 150 U. PA. L.
REV. 1553, 1553-84 (2002). The European Union recently proposed a draft
regulation on chemicals known as REACH (Registration, Evaluation and
Authorisation of Chemicals) that expressly adopts the precautionary principle
in restricting the use of a wide range of chemicals used in everything from
medicine to farming. Under the proposed regulations, REACH “reverses the
burden of proof” by forcing industry to provide evidence on the safe use of their
products before they can be marketed rather than forcing government
authorities to prove the products are dangerous in order to restrict them. See
EUROPEAN TRADE UNION CONFEDERATION, EU CHEMICAL SAFETY PROPOSAL –
REACH,
June
28,
2005
[hereinafter
REACH],
available
at
http://www.etuc.org/a/496; see also KEN GEISER & JOEL TICKNER, LOWELL
CENTER FOR SUSTAINABLE PRODUCTION, NEW DIRECTIONS IN EUROPEAN
CHEMICALS POLICY: DRIVERS, SCOPE, AND STATUS 7 (2003) (discussing history
of development and use of the precautionary principle in Europe).
37. See NRDC Comments, supra note 33, at 3-4 (arguing that the EPA
policy applies a lesser safety factor or no safety factor at all for children in the
absence of data justifying the need for the tenfold factor).
38. Other provisions of the FQPA require EPA to reassess the more than
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EPA’s implementation of the FQPA has been subject to
significant criticism, ranging from its failure to review the
approximately 10,000 existing pesticide tolerances by 2006
under the new provisions,39 failure to presumptively apply the
tenfold safety factor to protect children,40 and failure to require
manufacturers to test for the broader range of toxic effects in
adults and children set forth in the law.41 Some of these
criticisms have led to lawsuits against the Agency discussed
later in this Article. A review of these criticisms leads to the
conclusion that EPA so far has failed to create an adequate
regulatory structure under the FQPA to effectively protect
children’s health to the full extent available under the law.42
However, despite EPA’s failure to fully implement the
law’s precautionary principle with regard to children’s health
and pesticides, the fact remains that the FQPA on its face
rejects a cost-benefit analysis when it comes to pesticide
tolerances and their impact on children.
While EPA’s
shortcomings to date do not mean the agency will never use the
FQPA to its full potential, this Article explores whether
9,000 pesticide tolerances and exemptions in existence at the time the new law
was enacted to determine whether those tolerances meet the more stringent
FQPA standards. See 21 U.S.C. § 346a(q) (2000); American Farm Bureau v.
Envtl. Prot. Agency, 121 F. Supp. 2d 84, 89 (D.D.C. 2000). As amended, the
FFDCA sets forth a three-tiered schedule for reassessing existing tolerances
and exemptions, and requires that thirty-three percent be reassessed by
August 1999, sixty-six percent by August 2002, and 100 percent by August
2006. See 21 U.S.C. § 346a(q)(1). EPA is to give priority in the reassessment
to those tolerances and exemptions that “appear to pose the greatest risk to
public health.” 21 U.S.C. § 346a(q)(2). As of February 15, 2005, EPA had
reassessed over 7,140 of the 9,728 tolerances for pesticides in existence on
August 2, 1996. See Natural Res. Def. Council v. Whitman, No. C 99-03701
WHA, 2001 WL 1221774, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 24, 2001); Environmental Prot.
Agency: Alachlor, Carbaryl, Diazinon, Disulfoton, Pirimiphos-methyl, and
Vinclozolin; Proposed Tolerance Revocations, 70 Fed. Reg. 14,618, 14,621
(Mar. 23, 2005) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 180) (stating that EPA had
reassessed over 7,140 tolerances as of February 14, 2005). Finally, the law
requires EPA to promulgate regulations governing the establishment of
tolerances for pesticide uses exempted under FIFRA’s emergency provisions
within 365 days after enactment of the FQPA. See 21 U.S.C. § 346a(l)(6); 7
U.S.C. § 136p (2000).
39. See Whitman, No. C 99-03701 WHA, 2001 WL 1221774 (N.D. Cal.
Sept. 24, 2001).
40. See NRDC Comments, supra note 33, at 4-5; WALLINGA, supra note 4,
at 42-43 (criticizing EPA for its failure to routinely use the FQPA tenfold
safety factor in setting tolerances).
41. See, e.g., WALLINGA, supra note 4, at 47-50; Watnick, supra note 3, at
1341-43.
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common law claims, particularly claims against pesticide
manufacturers that emphasize the policy goals of the FQPA,
can act as a gap-filler to spur the creation and effective use of
scientific data in this area.
Section III of this Article thus evaluates case law involving
children’s health and pesticides in both an administrative law
and common law context. That Section concludes that while
direct challenges to EPA regulatory policy under the FQPA
have been less than successful so far, common law claims
against manufacturers may hold more promise to encourage
the collection of valuable scientific data that can be used to
protect children’s health.
III. PESTICIDES AND CHILDREN’S HEALTH IN THE
COURTS
This Section analyzes judicial decisions involving children’s
health and pesticides. There are countless cases involving
claims by children and their parents against pesticide
manufacturers for pesticide-related damages and numerous
other suits involving general challenges to EPA and other
agencies regarding pesticide-related rulemaking. However, the
cases discussed below are limited to those cases in which the
courts have wrestled specifically with evidentiary or policy
matters specific to children.
As a result, these cases provide some indication of the
availability or lack thereof of data and other studies specific to
children and pesticides as well as how the courts are dealing
with that evidence or lack of evidence. This Section starts with
an evaluation of claims against EPA and other regulatory
agencies. These cases tend to show that while claims against
EPA under the FQPA have not obtained major results,
administrative law cases in other contexts provide a roadmap
for how courts can invoke statutory precautionary principles to
place data-gathering incentives on pesticide manufacturers to
avoid risks to children. This Section then reviews common law
tort claims by children and their parents against pesticide
manufacturers and users. This evaluation establishes that in
light of the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Bates,43 common
law tort claims based on negligent testing and negligent design
principles can act as a catalyst to spur manufacturers to collect
and evaluate data not currently required by EPA. Courts can
43. 125 S. Ct. 1788 (2005).
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look to the precautionary principle embodied in the FQPA to do
so.
A. AGENCY CASES BEFORE THE FQPA
Not surprisingly, even before the enactment of the FQPA,
state and federal courts were called upon to consider the
impacts of pesticides on children’s health in an administrative
law context. A review of these early cases provides some
valuable historic lessons about the ability of the judiciary to
promote sound policy regarding children’s health and
pesticides.
One notable case involving children’s health and pesticides
in an administrative law context is National Association of
In that case,
Farmworkers Organizations v. Marshall.44
private nonprofit organizations representing farmworker
families sued the Secretary of the U.S. Department of Labor
over regulations governing employment of children younger
than twelve years of age for harvesting crops. In general,
federal law prohibited the employment of children under twelve
years of age, but a 1977 amendment to the law allowed
employers to apply to the Secretary for a waiver of the child
labor laws in order to employ ten- and eleven-year-old children
for harvesting short-season crops.45 Such waivers could be
granted only if, among other things, the levels and types of
pesticides and chemicals used “would not have an adverse
effect on the health or well-being of the individuals to whom
the waiver would apply.”46 Such findings by the Secretary to
grant a waiver had to be “based on objective data submitted by
the applicant.”47
In attempting to enact regulations under the 1977
amendments, the Department of Labor was faced with a
problem in setting uniform standards with little or no data
regarding the impact of pesticides on children. Indeed, when
the first set of regulations were proposed, representatives of
EPA, other agencies, and the public commented that
epidemiologic information for pesticide effects on children was
essentially nonexistent,48 that children are more vulnerable to
44. 628 F.2d 604 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
45. See id. at 606-07; see also 29 U.S.C. § 213(c) (2000).
46. Marshall, 628 F.2d at 607 (citing 29 U.S.C. § 213(c)(4)(A) (1979)).
47. Id.
48. See Bernard D. Goldstein & Mary Sue Henifin, Reference Guide on
Toxicology, in FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER, REFERENCE MANUAL ON
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harmful effects of pesticides than adults, and that there was no
basis on which to set standards to protect children from the
adverse effects of pesticide exposure.49
Despite this lack of data, the Department approved
numerous pesticides for use with “preharvest intervals” before
children could enter the field. It granted these approvals even
though EPA argued that the available data was insufficient to
make a decision on the safety of children exposed to the
pesticides, several of which were either known carcinogens or
found to be dangerous in the commissioned study.50
In response to a challenge to the approvals, the D.C.
Circuit Court of Appeals, in an opinion by Judge Bazelon,
began by framing the issue as “[h]ow can an administrator set
safety standards in the absence of adequate scientific
In answering that question, the court
evidence?”51
acknowledged that assuring safety in pesticide exposure “may
be beyond the range of scientific certainty at present.”52
However, the court rejected the argument that the Secretary
could not delay the issuance of waivers until he received
assurances that certain pesticides were absolutely safe or
presented zero risk because the state of scientific knowledge
could not soon, or ever, provide such assurances.53 The court
focused on the fact that the statute required a finding based on
“objective data” submitted by the applicant that the pesticides
would not have an effect on the health or well-being of the
individuals to whom the waiver would apply, but the Secretary
had no data that even tended to point in that direction.54 The
court took issue with the district court’s conclusion that the
state of scientific knowledge could not in the near future or ever
provide sufficient assurances for safety. The court held that
the study the Department had commissioned indicated that
data could be generated “time permitting,” but that the
Department did not seek any such studies before issuing its
SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE 401, 413 (2d ed. 2000) (defining epidemiology as “the
study of the incidence and distribution of disease in human populations”); see
also 40 C.F.R. § 158.340 (2004) (regarding toxicology data requirements for
pesticide registration).
49. See Marshall, 628 F.2d at 607-08.
50. See id. at 609-10.
51. Id. at 606.
52. Id. at 617 (citing NATIONAL ACAD. OF SCIENCES, SCIENCE AND
TECHNOLOGY: A FIVE-YEAR OUTLOOK 462 (1979)).
53. See id. at 617.
54. See id. at 617-18.
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lists of pesticides.55 Significantly, the court rejected the
premise that in the absence of good evidence, the Secretary was
justified in relying on the “best available evidence” in light of
the express statutory language requiring “objective data” to
support a waiver.56
The Marshall opinion is significant for several reasons.
First, throughout the opinion, the court cites extensively to
studies, data, and reports on the impact of pesticides on
children’s health and the lack of data available to establish
safety standards. Second, the opinion is an example of the
adoption of the precautionary principle over the more oftenused cost-benefit analysis in making decisions that impact
economic values on the one hand and public health and
environmental values on the other.57
Thus, helped along by the “objective data” standard in the
statute at issue, the court was able to place the protection of
children above any economic concerns. As a result, the court
put the burden on the defendants to create “objective data” to
justify continued use of pesticides in the presence of workers
under twelve years of age. In doing so, the court was able to
use its authority to promote gathering data and information
that could be used in further studies and legal proceedings.58
While there are certainly many other examples of courts
refusing to place such an information-gathering burden on
manufacturers to justify use of a pesticide, those cases
generally arise in the FIFRA regulatory context, where costbenefit analysis is expressly built into the statute. For
instance, in a pre-FQPA case, Love v. Thomas,59 the Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals rejected the use of the precautionary
principle over cost-benefit analysis in the context of pesticide
risks to children. In Love, farmers and food processors sought a
preliminary injunction against an EPA emergency suspension
order under FIFRA preventing further sale, distribution, or use
of pesticide products containing dinoseb.60 EPA had issued the
55. Marshall, 628 F.2d at 618-19.
56. Id. at 619 & n.73 (comparing other statutes that require safety
standards based on “best available evidence”).
57. See supra note 36 and accompanying text.
58. See also Chemical Specialties Mfrs. Ass’n v. Jorling, 85 N.Y.2d 382
(1995) (upholding state agency ban on pesticide products with high
concentrations of DEET based on evidence of risk to human health and
particularly children’s health).
59. 858 F.2d 1347 (9th Cir. 1988).
60. See id. at 1350-51.

KLASS_FINAL_120.DOC

2005]

01/09/2006 12:41:34 PM

PESTICIDES, CHILDREN’S HEALTH, AND TORT

105

order based on preliminary studies showing that dinoseb may
cause serious health risks to persons exposed to it, including
sterility in men and birth defects in the unborn children of
pregnant women.61
The Ninth Circuit held that EPA had acted in an arbitrary
and capricious manner in failing to consider the economic
benefits of dinoseb in issuing its order. The court concluded
that EPA had failed to adequately study the economic impact
on the plaintiffs and their crops and thus failed to conduct the
necessary balancing required by the statute.62 Indeed, the
court used strong language in stating that “[w]ith all due
respect to the EPA and its overworked staff, such insensitivity
to the local economic problems caused by its decision is
unbecoming and inappropriate.”63 In reaching its decision, the
court spent little time discussing EPA’s data on the pesticide’s
potential harm to unborn children and significant time
discussing EPA’s failure to consider data regarding the
economic benefits of the pesticide. As a result, the court placed
the information-gathering burden squarely on EPA, rather
than those wishing to manufacture and use the pesticide.
In many ways, the Love case is the mirror image of the
Marshall case. In Marshall, the lack of evidence quantifying
the pesticide’s risks meant that the pesticide could not be used.
In Love, the lack of evidence quantifying the pesticide’s benefits
meant that the restrictions on the pesticide were improper
despite potential harm to unborn children. This difference in
result is due, for the most part, to the very different provisions
of the two statutes at issue. While the labor law in Marshall
required “objective data” to allow a pesticide to be used with
child workers under twelve years of age, the key provisions of
FIFRA at issue in Love expressly incorporated a cost-benefit
analysis in determining whether a pesticide should be
suspended.64
61. See id. at 1350.
62. See id. at 1357-62.
63. Id. at 1362. The court went on to reverse the district court’s
injunction imposing conditions on the use of dinoseb on the grounds that the
district court’s authority was limited to stay the EPA order or leave it in place.
See id. at 1364 (citing 7 U.S.C. § 136d(c)(4)). The court thus remanded the
case to the lower court to consider whether it would have been willing to allow
the unrestricted use of dinoseb. See Love, 858 F.2d at 1364.
64. See 7 U.S.C. § 136a(c)(5)(D) (2000) (stating that a pesticide shall be
registered if, among other things, it will not cause “unreasonable adverse
effects on the environment” when used in accordance with widespread and
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What one can take away from these cases is that the courts
can exercise their authority to encourage manufacturers to
obtain new data to justify use of their pesticides in the presence
of a statutory precautionary principle. While the Marshall case
illustrates this in an administrative law context, such
principles can apply equally to tort claims against pesticide
manufacturers.
B. MORE AGENCY CASES: THE FQPA
It did not take long after the enactment of the FQPA for
the lawsuits to begin. However, a review of these cases shows
that at least so far, direct challenges to EPA action under the
FQPA have been less than effective, and the courts have rarely
reached the merits of any dispute. Thus, in the short term, it
may be wise to look beyond administrative law challenges to
the potential of tort law to spur greater protection for children’s
health.
The first lawsuit, American Farm Bureau v. United States
Environmental Protection Agency,65 was brought by pesticide
manufacturers and farm groups against EPA alleging that the
agency had failed to: (1) set tolerances for emergency
exemptions under FIFRA, (2) promulgate data requirements
for establishing and continuing tolerances, (3) update data
requirements for registering pesticides under FIFRA, (4)
comply with various data collection requirements to complete
tolerance assessments, and (5) follow appropriate rulemaking
procedures in implementing a FQPA infant and child safety
factor policy.66
The District Court for the District of Columbia dismissed
most of the claims for lack of standing. Of most interest for
purposes of this Article is the plaintiffs’ argument that they
had suffered economic injury “as a result of the uncertainty
about pesticide safety created by the EPA’s alleged failure to
meet its tolerance reassessment schedule.”67 Plaintiffs further
commonly recognized practice); 7 U.S.C. § 136(bb) (2000) (defining
“unreasonable adverse effects on the environment” as taking into account the
“economic, social, and environmental costs and benefits of the use of any
pesticide”).
65. 121 F. Supp. 2d 84 (D.D.C. 2000).
66. See id. at 89-90. This last argument involved the EPA’s alleged
failure to apply the presumptive tenfold safety factor for infants and children
required by the FQPA in the absence of “reliable data” showing a different
margin of safety should be used. See 21 U.S.C. § 346a(b)(2)(C) (2000).
67. American Farm Bureau, 121 F. Supp. 2d at 99.
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alleged that they would have to expend funds on “public
education and outreach” to combat “misinformation about crop
protection and other chemical products” and would suffer from
“product deselection by consumers, growers, and pesticide
manufacturers.”68 In rejecting the plaintiffs’ claim of economic
injury, the court held that the alleged injuries were not
concrete and particularized, and moreover, the plaintiffs failed
to demonstrate a causal connection between the alleged harm
and EPA’s alleged inaction.69
The American Farm Bureau case was quickly followed by a
challenge from the other side. The Natural Resources Defense
Council (NRDC) and other environmental groups sued EPA for
inadequate regulation of pesticides under the FQPA in Natural
Initially, the
Resources Defense Council v. Whitman.70
plaintiffs alleged that EPA had failed to meet the tolerancereassessment deadlines and priorities in the FQPA. Most of
the original parties reached a settlement, but the settlement
was later challenged by the American Farm Bureau and other
farming and pesticide manufacturing interests. In dismissing
the challenge to the settlement, the court rejected the
argument that the consent decree would have “devastating
economic consequences” on the manufacturing and farming
community, noting that the law does not require EPA to assess
the economic consequences of performing reevaluations.71 The
court did note, however, that “[t]o the extent EPA fails to
properly account for the economic benefits of a given pesticide
in any final rule, judicial review will be available.”72
The next case involving the FQPA, Croplife America v.
Environmental Protection Agency,73 was a challenge by
pesticide manufacturers and trade associations to an EPA
directive that it would no longer accept third-party human
studies in regulatory decisionmaking. The petitioners alleged
that the directive was a binding regulation rather than a policy
statement and required formal notice and comments prior to
enactment. The petitioners further alleged they were injured
because the new policy precluded EPA’s consideration of
studies petitioners had previously used to verify the safety of
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.

Id.
See id.
No. C 99-03701 WHA, 2001 WL 1221774 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 24, 2001).
See id. at *20.
Id.
329 F.3d 876 (D.C. Cir. 2003).
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their products.74 In this 2003 opinion, the D.C. Circuit Court of
Appeals held that EPA’s broad moratorium on the use of thirdparty human test data (which had been allowed on a case-bycase basis in the past) was a binding regulation enforceable
against the petitioners and subject to notice and comment
requirements.75 Once again, the case did not allow the court to
reach the merits of data requirements or other issues at the
heart of the FQPA.
Finally, in 2004, in New York v. United States
Environmental Protection Agency,76 states and nonprofit groups
sued EPA for failure to apply the presumptive tenfold margin
of safety for children in reassessing certain pesticide tolerances.
The plaintiffs argued that by “leaving certain existing
tolerances in place for these pesticides without applying the
tenfold margin of safety, the EPA failed to take into account
scientific data demonstrating serious safety risks.”77 The
plaintiffs also alleged that EPA’s failure to designate
farmworkers’ children as a “major identifiable subgroup”
violated the FQPA because of their heightened vulnerability to
pesticide exposures.78 Although the allegations in this case
went to the heart of the FQPA requirements relating to
children, the District Court for the Southern District of New
York dismissed the case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
The court reasoned that section 408(h)(1) of the FQPA vested
jurisdiction in the federal courts of appeals and that the
plaintiffs had not exhausted their administrative remedies.79
Thus, once again, efforts to reach the merits of the suit were
derailed.
Efforts to force EPA to fulfill its mandate under the FQPA
continue. In June 2005, NRDC and other groups filed suit
against EPA in the Northern District of California for failure to
designate children of farmworkers as a “major identifiable
subgroup” subject to special protection under the FQPA.80 In
support of their claims, the plaintiffs detailed the fact that
74. See id. at 884.
75. Id. at 881.
76. 350 F. Supp. 2d 429 (S.D.N.Y. 2004).
77. Id. at 432.
78. See id. at 433.
79. See id. at 438 (citing 21 U.S.C. § 346a(h)(1), (g)(2)(C) (2000)).
80. See Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief and Petition for
Writ of Mandamus at 10, Pesticide Action Network North America v. United
States Envtl. Prot. Agency, No. 4:05CV02312, (N.D. Cal. June 7, 2005); see
also 21 U.S.C. § 346a(b)(2)(D) (2000).
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more than one million children of farmworkers and farmers live
in this country, and more than 300,000 children under the age
of six live on farms. The plaintiffs cited studies showing that
children are at heightened risk of harm from pesticides and
that children on farms, because of their proximity to direct
application of pesticides, are at even greater risk.81
The plaintiffs alleged that EPA had failed to respond to an
October 1998 petition by NRDC and other groups requesting
the agency to identify children living on or near farms as a
“major identifiable subgroup.”
The plaintiffs sought a
declaratory judgment that EPA’s failure to respond to the
petition violated the Administrative Procedure Act82 and asked
the court to compel the agency to respond to the petition in
ninety days.83 In August 2005, the plaintiffs voluntarily
dismissed that action without prejudice when EPA acted on the
NRDC’s original petition through its issuance of an “Order
Denying Objections to Issuance of Tolerances” on August 10,
2005.84
NRDC and other nonprofits followed the dismissal of this
suit with a set of new lawsuits that are being consolidated in
the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. These lawsuits challenge
directly EPA’s August 10, 2005 Order, its refusal to treat farm
children as a major identifiable subgroup under the FQPA,
EPA’s refusal to apply a tenfold safety factor on certain
pesticides in the absence of developmental neurotoxicity testing
(DNT) data establishing that the pesticides at issue are not
neurotoxic, and EPA’s action on other pesticide tolerance issues
under the FQPA.85 What the court will do with this most
81. See Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief and Petition for
Writ of Mandamus, supra note 80, at 4-10 (citing NATURAL RES. DEF.
COUNCIL, supra note 28; NATURAL RES. DEF. COUNCIL, HIDDEN DANGER:
ENVIRONMENTAL HEALTH THREATS IN THE LATINO COMMUNITY (2004); and
COMMITTEE ON PESTICIDES IN THE DIETS OF INFANTS AND CHILDREN, supra
note 26).
82. See 5 U.S.C. §§ 553(e), 555(b) (2000).
83. See Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief and Petition for
Writ of Mandamus, supra note 80, at 11.
84. See Notice of Voluntary Dismissal Without Prejudice Under Fed. R.
Civ. P. 41(a)(1), Pesticide Action North America v. United States Envtl. Prot.
Agency, No. 05-02312-CW (N.D. Cal. Oct. 4, 2005); see also Order Denying
Objections to Issuance of Tolerances, 70 Fed. Reg. 46,706 (Aug. 10, 2005).
85. See Northwest Coalition for Alternatives to Pesticides v. United States
Envtl. Prot. Agency, No. 05-75255 (9th Cir., Sept. 1, 2005) (appealing EPA
Order); Notice of Selection of Venue by MDL Panel, Croplife America v. United
States Envtl. Prot. Agency, No. 05-1343 (D.C. Cir. Oct. 12, 2005) (consolidating
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recent suit remains to be seen. However, the cases so far show
that FQPA administrative litigation is in its early stages where
decisions on the merits can force EPA and/or pesticide
manufacturers to adequately implement the law’s provisions.
Indeed, the level of analysis of children’s health issues in the
cases prior to the enactment of the FQPA is much more robust
than in cases brought under the FQPA itself. While this will
certainly change as more agency actions are taken under the
FQPA, for now it may be prudent to consider whether lawsuits
beyond challenging EPA’s administration of the FQPA may
help spur additional data collection and promote protection of
children’s health.
C. DATA GAPS AND PREEMPTION: THE MANUFACTURER CASES
Lawsuits seeking damages for pesticide exposure have
been around since before the 1972 FIFRA amendments.
Problems of proof, even in meritorious cases, have historically
posed significant barriers. This is particularly true for cases
involving children, when even less scientific evidence on
exposure levels and effects is available.86 As shown below, the
problem is circular. Because pesticide manufacturers still have
not conducted sufficient studies in many cases to establish a
link or lack thereof between pesticide exposure and harm to
children, such data is not available to plaintiffs when such
harm may occur. For instance, EPA does not require even
basic neurotoxicity testing in order to register a pesticide under
FIFRA, even though a protocol for conducting such tests was
extensively validated years ago.87 This lack of data makes such
lawsuits expensive, difficult, and in the end, often (but not
always) unsuccessful. The problem is, of course, exacerbated by
the fact that in the absence of regulatory requirements,
pesticide manufacturers have no incentive to conduct testing,
actions challenging EPA’s August 10, 2005 Order in the Court of Appeals for
the Ninth Circuit); Amended Petition for Review, Natural Res. Def. Council v.
United States Envtl. Prot. Agency, No. 05-4773 (2d Cir. Aug. 31, 2005); see
also EPA, Notice to the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation of
Multicircuit Petitions for Review (Sept. 27, 2005).
86. See, e.g., WARGO, supra note 1, at 177-78 (stating there is no
systematic method or model appropriate to predict variation in age-related
susceptibility to toxins); Schon, supra note 3, at 708-09 (noting that it was not
until the 1990s that studies and publicity emphasized that children were not
“little adults” for purposes of data collection and regulation with regard to
pesticides).
87. See WALLINGA, supra note 4, at 61.
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even when protocols are available, because such data could
then be used against them in lawsuits or in efforts to cancel the
pesticide registration.88
Moreover, until recently, federal preemption under FIFRA
posed a nearly insurmountable barrier to many claims for
pesticide damages against manufacturers. As discussed below,
although evidentiary problems remain a significant hurdle, the
federal preemption problem has lessened significantly as a
result of the Supreme Court’s 2005 decision in Bates. Thus,
Bates provides an opening for the common law to act as a
catalyst to improve pesticide testing and design that better
protect children’s health.
1. Scientific Evidence Hurdles
Examples of children who have been prevented from
proceeding to trial against manufacturers for alleged pesticiderelated damages are easy to find. This is in large part a result
of the impact of the Supreme Court’s decision in Daubert v.
Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.89 In Daubert, the Court
announced a new standard for admissibility of scientific
evidence in federal court based on Federal Rules of Evidence
702 and 703. In order to allow expert, scientific testimony to be
presented at trial, the trial judge must determine at the outset
whether the reasoning or methodology underlying the
testimony is scientifically valid and whether that reasoning or
methodology properly can be applied to the facts.90 Thus,
before admitting scientific evidence, the trial judge must act as
a “gatekeeper”91 regarding what scientific evidence can be
presented to the jury.
The Court further refined this direction in General Electric
88. See, e.g., Wendy E. Wagner, Choosing Ignorance in the Manufacture of
Toxic Products, 82 CORNELL L. REV. 773, 805 (1997) (noting the irony in the
current common law tort system—requiring a plaintiff to prove causation in
all cases allows a manufacturer to escape liability when the plaintiff cannot
prove the manufacturer’s product caused the plaintiff’s harm, “even though
this proof problem is a direct result of the manufacturer’s inadequate testing”);
Wendy E. Wagner, Common Ignorance: The Failure of Environmental Law to
Produce Needed Information on Health and the Environment, 53 DUKE L.J.
1619, 1639 (2004) (“Remaining ignorant about the potential harms caused by
one’s products and activities increases the likelihood that the actor can avoid
tort suits and stay out of the range of plaintiffs’ attorneys’ radar.”).
89. 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
90. See id. at 592-93; see also id. at 593-94 (discussing the four factors
courts are directed to consider when evaluating whether to admit testimony).
91. See id. at 597.
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Co. v. Joiner,92 in which it affirmed the trial court’s rejection of
each of the plaintiff’s proffered animal and epidemiological
studies in support of plaintiff’s claim that exposure to PCBs
caused his cancer. In doing so, the Court let stand the trial
court’s rejection of a weight-of-the-evidence approach to reach
conclusions on causation and risk in favor of making each study
stand on its own.93 Because the defendants were able to attack
each of the plaintiff’s studies separately (for example, based on
the age of the animals tested in one study, and the
circumstances of the humans impacted in another), the ability
to evaluate the evidence based on its totality was lost.94
Commentators have persuasively argued that this studyby-study approach prevents experts in toxic tort cases from
applying a cumulative weight-of-the-evidence approach that is
used overwhelmingly in risk assessments by scientists and
agencies.95 As a result, judges who may lack any scientific
expertise are using non-scientific methods to prevent scientific
testimony from being heard at trial.96 Certainly one can
persuasively argue that the standard for holding a defendant
legally liable for significant damages in a toxic tort case should
require more evidence than that used by a regulatory agency to
set standards prospectively. However, the Daubert standard
was designed to address only the admissibility of scientific
evidence, not require plaintiffs’ experts to demonstrate before
trial that each study relied upon can on its own prove the
plaintiff’s case. Thus, using the arguably unscientific and
narrow inquiry reflected in Joiner is both counterproductive to
the goals of the tort system and excessively burdensome for
plaintiffs in many pesticide cases.
Two Eighth Circuit cases demonstrate the significant
impact of Daubert and Joiner in cases involving children’s

92. 522 U.S. 136 (1997).
93. See id. at 144-46.
94. See Thomas O. McGarity, Proposal for Linking Culpability and
Causation to Ensure Corporate Accountability for Toxic Risks, 26 WM. & MARY
ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 1, 19-23 (2001) (discussing Joiner’s “corpuscular”
approach to Daubert and arguing that such an approach to determining the
admissibility of expert testimony results in courts imposing a much less
scientific approach to causation than regulatory agencies charged with
protecting citizens from risk).
95. See, e.g., Thomas O. McGarity, Daubert and the Proper Role for the
Courts in Health, Safety, and Environmental Regulation, 95 AM. J. PUB.
HEALTH S92, S95 (Supp. 1 2005).
96. See id.
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health and pesticides.
In two cases involving different
plaintiffs, the court of appeals held that the plaintiffs, each who
suffered from birth defects allegedly resulting from the
mother’s exposure to pesticides containing the chemical
Dursban during the early stages of pregnancy, could not go
forward with a negligent design claim against the
manufacturer.97 In the first Dursban case, the court reasoned
that three scholarly articles discussing the connection between
the chemical and the birth defects did “not provide the requisite
support” to show causation.98 In the second case, the court of
appeals affirmed the lower court’s determination that the
causation opinions of the physician and chemist hired by
plaintiffs did not meet the scientific methodology required by
Daubert.99
Notably, in the latter case, the lower court concluded that
the plaintiffs’ experts did not present sufficient evidence that
Dursban is capable of causing birth defects or that the mother’s
exposure to Dursban during pregnancy caused the birth defects
at issue.100 The court rejected the plaintiffs’ reliance on studies
conducted by Dow, letters from Dow to EPA, and articles
written by one of the plaintiffs’ experts on the subject. The
court found that the experts were not able to point to
“epidemiological
studies
consistently
and
repeatedly
demonstrating any statistical association between the exposure
of pregnant women to Dursban and any increase in human
birth defects.”101 The court also held that there were no
appropriate animal models because the dose amounts were not
comparable.102
In discussing the available evidence, the court noted that
although Dursban had been on the market for over thirty
years, there was no data showing that increases in the type of
birth defects at issue in the case paralleled the increase in sales
and use of Dursban.103 The court noted an epidemiological
97. See National Bank of Commerce, of El Dorado, Ark. v. Dow Chem. Co.,
165 F.3d 602, 610 (8th Cir. 1999); National Bank of Commerce, of El Dorado,
Ark. v. Dow Chem. Co., 133 F.3d 1132, 1132 (8th Cir. 1998) (per curiam), aff’g
965 F. Supp. 1490 (E.D. Ark. 1996).
98. National Bank of Commerce, 165 F.3d at 609.
99. See 133 F.3d at 1132.
100. See National Bank of Commerce, of El Dorado, Ark. v. Dow Chem. Co.,
965 F. Supp. 1490, 1519 (E.D. Ark. 1996).
101. Id. at 1528.
102. See id.
103. See id. at 1552 app. F. Significantly, there is no national tracking
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study had been conducted on Dursban which failed to find any
link between the pesticide and birth defects. In response to the
plaintiffs’ argument that the study was not reliable and should
not be given weight, the court stated that it would be better if
more studies were available, but the study was “the only such
study,” so it had to be carefully considered.104
Similarly, in a case from the District Court for the District
of West Virginia, the court held that the plaintiffs’ animal
studies and in vitro tests tending to show that the plaintiff’s
birth defects were caused by the mother’s exposure to the
fungicide Benlate were not reliable.105 While acknowledging
that animal testing and in vitro studies can often be useful in
the field of human toxicology, the court held that the proffered
studies were not reliable because the dose rates were not
comparable to human exposure levels and because other
human and animal studies tended to show no link between the
pesticide and birth defects.106
These cases are merely examples of the difficulties children
face in simply getting to a jury, much less recovering damages,
from alleged exposure to pesticides. Certainly, it is improper to
hold manufacturer defendants liable for damages if the
plaintiffs cannot present sufficient evidence to establish
causation. The problem, however, is that the lack of data is not
always a function of a lack of causal connection between the
system for birth defects resulting from pesticides or other factors, making such
data virtually impossible to collect. See, e.g., Services, Education, and Related
Agencies Appropriations for 2002: Before the Subcomm. on the Departments of
Labor, Health and Human Services, Education, and Related Agencies of the H.
Comm. on Appropriations, 107th Cong. 322 (2002) (statement of Louis Stokes,
H. Rep. from Ohio).
104. See National Bank of Commerce, 965 F. Supp. at 1554 app. F.
105. See Bourne v. E.I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co., Inc., 189 F. Supp. 2d
482, 495-99 (S.D. W. Va. 2002), aff’d, 85 F. App’x 964 (4th Cir. 2004).
106. See id. For criticism of courts rejecting animal studies despite the fact
that many scientists consider animal studies more reliable than
epidemiological studies, see Margaret A. Berger, What Has a Decade of
Daubert Wrought?, 95 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH S59, S61-S62 (Supp. 1 2005)
(giving an example of a court rejecting that animal studies can ever support
causation); Carl Cranor, Scientific Inferences in the Laboratory and the Law,
95 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH, S121, S123-S124 (Supp. 1 2005) (citing court
requirements for human epidemiological evidence even where such evidence is
less reliable than other existing evidence or unavailable); and Ronald L.
Melnick, A Daubert Motion: A Legal Strategy to Exclude Essential Scientific
Evidence in Toxic Tort Litigation, 95 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH, S30, S31 (Supp. 1
2005) (stating that while some judges may have claimed that results from
animal studies cannot be extrapolated to humans, “this opinion is contrary to
the positions of all public health agencies, both national and international”).
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pesticide and harm, but simply a lack of available data because
the studies have not been required by EPA or anyone else as
part of the FIFRA registration process.
Indeed, the epidemiological studies many courts appear to
require cannot even be conducted because of ethical problems
with exposing humans to potentially harmful pesticides for
scientific purposes.107 Moreover, manufacturers currently have
no incentive to undertake many available animal and in vitro
studies that could potentially provide valuable data because
such studies are not required by EPA.108 In the absence of any
regulatory requirement to perform toxicological studies or other
studies before or after the registration process is complete, any
additional data that calls into question the pesticide’s safety
only serves to threaten the pesticide’s registration as well as
provide ammunition to plaintiffs who allege they have been
damaged by the pesticide.109
Imposing requirements that plaintiffs provide data that is
best collected by the manufacturer or data that cannot be
collected at all under current ethical policy is directly contrary
to the statutory directive in the FQPA that in the face of
scientific uncertainty, protection of children’s health should
prevail. Instead, many courts presently err on the side of no
protection for children’s health. This problem has only been
exacerbated by Daubert,110 which has been used successfully by
107. See Croplife Am. v. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 329 F.3d 876, 884-85 (D.C.
Cir. 2003); Miller, supra note 8, at 696 (discussing ethical debates over
accepting data from epidemiological studies using paid volunteers).
108. See TED SCHETTLER ET AL., GREATER BOSTON PHYSICIANS FOR SOC.
RESPONSIBILITY, IN HARM’S WAY: TOXIC THREATS TO CHILD DEVELOPMENT
107-08 (2000); WALLINGA, supra note 4, at 62.
109. See McGarity, supra note 94, at 35 (stating that the absence of
empirical evidence in toxic tort cases is not surprising because “a company has
very little to gain and nothing to lose from keeping itself and the world
ignorant of the risks that its products pose to others” (citing Wendy E.
Wagner, Choosing Ignorance in the Manufacture of Toxic Products, 82
CORNELL L. REV. 773, 774, 794-95 (1997))).
110. See Cunningham-Parmeter, supra note 3, at 494 (citing MARK J.
CARPENTER & GEORGE W. WARE, DEFENDING PESTICIDES IN LITIGATION §
9:10, at 217 (2003)) (noting that Daubert, in practice, has been used “to
exclude testimony by scientific experts who fail to rely on the expensive,
conventional studies that are conspicuously absent in pesticide research”); see
also PAUL C. GIANNELLI, UNDERSTANDING EVIDENCE § 24.04[5] (2003) (stating
that while some believed Daubert was a more lenient standard than the Frye
standard when Daubert was decided in 1993, subsequent Supreme Court
decisions and lower court implementation of the new standard show that
Daubert “erects a formidable barrier to the admissibility of expert testimony”).
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defendant manufacturers to prevent plaintiffs from presenting
their evidence to the jury because of the unavailability of data
that only the manufacturers themselves are in a position to
collect.111 This current state of affairs serves neither science
nor children and prevents the tort system from playing any
significant role in shaping corporate behavior.
However, the potential of such claims to succeed is
evidenced by cases in which the plaintiff has overcome the legal
hurdles to recover damages. In a 2003 case, Castillo v. E.I. Du
Pont de Nemours & Co.,112 the Florida Supreme Court held that
the plaintiffs’ evidence that a child’s rare birth defect was
caused by his mother’s exposure to Benlate during pregnancy
was sufficient to support a damages award.113 The child was
born with microphthalmia, a rare birth defect involving
severely underdeveloped eyes.114 The plaintiffs obtained a $4
million verdict against DuPont and the farm that sprayed the
chemical, but the court of appeals reversed on the grounds that
the scientific evidence should not have been admitted.115
In reversing the court of appeals, the supreme court
analyzed the standard for admission of scientific evidence
applicable in Florida116 and held that human epidemiological
studies were not necessary in this case because pesticide
exposure of this kind was rare to begin with, and it would be
unethical to expose humans to a substance known to cause
birth defects in animals for testing purposes.117 In response to
the defendants’ challenge to the use of in vitro test results, the
court rejected the argument that the technique used was
invalid simply because it was new. The court stated that if it
accepted the defendants’ position, every new scientific method
would be denied.118 The court ultimately concluded that the
lower appellate court had held the plaintiffs to a standard
111. See supra note 84 and accompanying text.
112. 854 So. 2d 1264 (Fla. 2003).
113. See id. at 1280.
114. See id. at 1266.
115. See id. at 1267-68. The verdict allocated 99.5% of the damages
against Du Pont and 0.5% against the farm. See id. at 1267.
116. Florida, like many other states, still relies on the test set forth in Frye
v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923), for admission of scientific
evidence at trial. Under the Frye test, the court must find that the scientific
evidence is based on methods generally accepted by the relevant members of
the particular field. See id. at 1268.
117. See Castillo, 854 So. 2d at 1270.
118. See id. at 1272-73.
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above and beyond the requirements for scientific evidence in
Florida.119
Similarly, in a 2000 case, the Nebraska Court of Appeals
affirmed a verdict for the plaintiffs against a city for negligent
spraying of the pesticide malathion, which allegedly resulted in
a child developing a generalized seizure disorder.120 In holding
the evidence on exposure and effects of malathion sufficient to
support a verdict for the plaintiff, the court focused on scientific
evidence regarding the known effects of malathion, the child’s
symptoms, and the amount of exposure.121 At trial, the child
was described as mild-mannered, affectionate, and loving,
while after he was sprayed with malathion, he experienced
seizures, irritability, and severe intellectual defects.122 In
rejecting the defendant’s arguments that the plaintiffs had
failed to prove sufficient levels of exposure, the court stated
that it was “not prepared to hold that a plaintiff must prove a
mathematically precise level of exposure in order to recover in
a toxic tort case.”123
The Florida and Nebraska cases stand in contrast to the
federal cases discussed earlier in that the courts allowed the
plaintiffs to go forward on claims based on scientific evidence
even where that evidence was not “perfect.” In each case, the
court recognized that the optimal studies might not be
available, so the plaintiffs could rely on evidence that was
“reliable.” Although the difference in outcomes between the
two sets of cases may be attributable in part to the Daubert
standard applicable in federal court, the latter cases recognize
that the absence of a large body of research data does not mean
the evidence that is available is so unreliable that the plaintiff
is prevented from having his or her day in court. The need to
exercise such discretion in favor of admissibility is arguably
greater in cases involving the impacts of pesticides on children,
where the FQPA not only recognizes the link between
pesticides and harm to children as a general matter, but
announces a precautionary principle when it comes to data
uncertainty.
In the end, the message to take away from the cases is
119.
120.
*1, *17
121.
122.
123.

See id. at 1276.
See Amateis v. City of Bridgeport, No. A-98-1270, 2000 WL 868510, at
(Neb. Ct. App. June 27, 2000).
See id. at *5-13.
See id. at *10-13.
Id. at *15.
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somewhat mixed. Liability verdicts against manufacturers can
influence which products are on the market and what warnings
accompany those products.124 Although manufacturers warn
that valuable products will not be available to consumers at low
costs without a full suite of pesticides,125 it is not difficult to
posit that higher consumer costs may be a legitimate tradeoff
for the removal of products that are harmful to children’s
health and that quite possibly incur even larger and longerterm health-related costs to society. Certainly it is within the
province of EPA to set that balance in the first instance under
FIFRA’s cost-benefit provisions as well as the precautionary
principle embodied in the FQPA. However, the fact that
successful lawsuits can prompt manufacturers to voluntarily
remove pesticides from the market means that litigation can
often remove a harmful pesticide from production more quickly
than an EPA cancellation proceeding.126
2. Breaking Apart FIFRA Preemption
For nearly twenty years, there has been a massive amount
of litigation over the extent to which FIFRA preempts state law
tort claims under the supremacy clause of the U.S.
Constitution.127 Although some early cases had interpreted
124. See Brief of Amici Curiae Natural Resources Defense Council, et al. in
Support of Petitioners at 13-23, Bates v. Dow Agrosciences LLC, 125 S. Ct.
1788 (2005) (No. 03-388) (using examples of pesticides voluntarily taken off
the market as a result of tort lawsuits but prior to EPA action to show the
ability of state tort actions to create additional incentives for manufacturers to
protect human health and the environment).
125. See National Ass’n of Farmworkers Org. v. Marshall, 628 F.2d 604,
616 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (arguing that additional burdens on growers will result in
higher consumer prices); Brief of CropLife America and National Pest
Management Association as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondent at 17-18,
Bates v. Dow Agrosciences LLC, 125 S. Ct. 1788 (2005) (No. 03-388) (arguing
that without federal preemption, pesticide manufactures would be confronted
with different standards in different states and might be forced to forgo sales
in some states, thus depriving farmers of effective pesticides).
126. For instance, the numerous lawsuits by children born without eyes or
severely underdeveloped eyes allegedly resulting from their mothers’ exposure
to benomyl can be seen as one of the factors that led to Du Pont requesting
cancellation of all its product registrations containing that pesticide even
though EPA was prepared to address the matter through label warnings. See,
e.g., Castillo v. E.I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co., 854 So. 2d 1264 (Fla. 2003);
Brief of Amici Curiae Natural Resources Defense Council, et al. in Support of
Petitioners, supra note 124, at 13-29 (using the benomyl lawsuits and other
examples to show the ability of state tort actions to create additional
incentives for manufacturers to protect human health and the environment).
127. See 7 U.S.C. § 136v(b) (2000) (providing the basis for FIFRA
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FIFRA preemption narrowly to retain a significant role for
common law tort claims, they were quickly followed by
decisions in nearly every federal circuit applying FIFRA
preemption broadly to prevent plaintiffs from using the tort law
system to obtain compensation for pesticide-related harm and
shape corporate behavior. This changed in April 2005 with the
Supreme Court’s Bates decision. Bates has the potential to
significantly expand the role tort law can play in encouraging
pesticide manufacturers to better assess the health risks their
products pose and develop new products through testing. Such
pressure has the potential to help protect children’s health
from the adverse effects of pesticides and fill in some of the
gaps created by EPA shortcomings in this area.
a. The Early FIFRA Preemption Cases
The first federal cases to consider whether FIFRA
preempted common law claims against manufacturers for
pesticide damages were decided in the 1980s and early 1990s.
These cases often rejected preemption arguments and held that
the plaintiffs could recover damages based on failure to warn
theories.128 In a well-known case, Ferebee v. Chevron Chemical
Co.,129 the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals held that state
common law claims and FIFRA have separate functions, and
while FIFRA served to ensure a pesticide did not have
unreasonable adverse effects based on a net benefit analysis,
preemption). For a detailed discussion of the history of federal preemption
under FIFRA, see Klass, supra note 11.
128. See Thornton v. Fondren Green Apts., 788 F. Supp. 928, 932 (S.D. Tex.
1992); Montana Pole & Treating Plant v. I.F. Laucks & Co., 775 F. Supp. 1339,
1343-45 (D. Mont. 1991), aff’d on other grounds, 993 F.2d 676 (9th Cir. 1993);
Riden v. ICI Ams., Inc., 763 F. Supp. 1500, 1503-09 (W.D. Mo. 1991); Evenson
v. Osmose Wood Preserving, Inc., 760 F. Supp. 1345, 1347-48 (S.D. Ind. 1990);
Cox v. Velsicol Chem. Corp., 704 F. Supp. 85, 86-87 (E.D. Pa. 1989); Roberts v.
Dow Chem. Co., 702 F. Supp. 195, 196-99 (N.D. Ill. 1988); Wilson v. Chevron
Chem. Co., No. 83 Civ. 762, 1986 WL 14925, at *5-6 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 17, 1986).
But see Papas v. Upjohn Co., 926 F.2d 1019, 1024-26 (11th Cir. 1991) (holding
state law claims impliedly preempted), vacated by Papas v. Zoecon Corp., 505
U.S. 1215 (1992); Hurt v. Dow Chem. Co., 759 F. Supp. 556, 558-60 (E.D. Mo.
1990) (finding some state claims preempted, but not others); Herr v. Carolina
Log Bldgs., Inc., 771 F. Supp. 958, 960-61 (S.D. Ind. 1989) (same); Kennan v.
Dow Chem. Co., 717 F. Supp. 799, 803-07 (M.D. Fla. 1989) (holding state
failure to warn claim impliedly preempted); Fisher v. Chevron Chem. Co., 716
F. Supp. 1283, 1287-89 (W.D. Mo. 1989) (same); Fitzgerald v. Mallinckrodt,
Inc., 681 F. Supp. 404, 406-08 (E.D. Mich. 1987) (holding both failure to warn
and negligent labeling claims preempted).
129. 736 F.2d 1529 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
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state tort law provided compensation for injury for failure to
warn against a known and significant risk.130 The court stated
that a pesticide manufacturer faced with damage awards could
assess whether to continue to sell the product or change the
label to limit its liability.131 In rejecting preemption, the court
also reasoned that even though FIFRA does not allow states to
directly impose additional labeling requirements, it does allow
states to impose more stringent constraints on the use of
pesticides within its jurisdiction.132
b. The Era of Broad FIFRA Preemption
The FIFRA preemption landscape changed dramatically
with the Supreme Court’s 1992 decision in Cipollone v. Liggett
Group, Inc.133 The Court held that a smoker’s claim for
damages against a cigarette manufacturer under a failure to
warn theory was preempted by section 5(b) of the Public Health
Smoking Act of 1969, which prohibited state regulation of
advertising or promotion of cigarettes labeled in conformity
In holding that the 1969 law
with the federal law.134
preempted the plaintiff’s failure to warn claim, the Court found
that the phrase “[n]o requirement or prohibition” did not
distinguish between positive enactments and common law
The Court reasoned that state
claims for damages.135
regulation “can be as effectively exerted through an award of
damages as through some form of preventative relief. The
obligation to pay compensation can be, indeed is designed to be,
a potent method of governing conduct and controlling policy.”136
Cipollone had an immediate impact on common law tort
claims against pesticide manufacturers. After the decision,
virtually all the federal circuit courts and many state supreme
130. See id. at 1540-41.
131. See id. at 1541.
132. See id.
133. 505 U.S. 504 (1992).
134. See id. at 524-25. The operative language in the Public Health
Cigarette Smoking Act of 1969 stated that “[n]o requirement or prohibition
based on smoking and health shall be imposed under State law with respect to
the advertising or promotion of any cigarettes the packages of which are
labeled in conformity with the provisions of this Act.” Id. at 515 (quoting the
Public Health Cigarette Smoking Act of 1969 § 5(b), Pub. L. No. 91-222, 84
Stat. 87 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1334(b) (2000))).
135. See Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 521.
136. Id. (quoting San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236,
247 (1959)) (internal quotation marks omitted).

KLASS_FINAL_120.DOC

2005]

01/09/2006 12:41:34 PM

PESTICIDES, CHILDREN’S HEALTH, AND TORT

121

courts held that state law tort claims challenging pesticide
product labels were preempted by FIFRA,137 although there
was a split among the courts over whether claims related to
product efficacy, non-label-related consumer fraud, and
voluntary label statements (as opposed to those required by
FIFRA) were preempted.138

137. See, e.g., Dow Agrosciences LLC v. Bates, 332 F.3d 323 (5th Cir. 2003),
vacated and remanded, 125 S. Ct. 1788 (2005); Lowe’s Home Ctrs., Inc. v. Olin
Corp., 313 F.3d 1307 (11th Cir. 2002); Netland v. Hess & Clark, Inc. 284 F.3d
895 (8th Cir. 2002); Hawkins v. Leslie’s Pool Mart, Inc., 184 F.3d 244 (3rd Cir.
1999); Kuiper v. Am. Cyanamid Co., 131 F.3d 656 (7th Cir. 1997); Grenier v.
Vt. Log Bldgs., Inc., 96 F.3d 559 (1st Cir. 1996); Taylor AG Indus. v. Pure-Gro,
54 F.3d 555 (9th Cir. 1995); Lowe v. Sporicidin Int’l, 47 F.3d 124 (4th Cir.
1995); Papas v. Upjohn Co., 985 F.2d 516 (11th Cir. 1993); Arkansas-Platte &
Gulf P’ship v. Van Waters & Rogers, Inc., 959 F.2d 158 (10th Cir. 1992),
vacated by Arkansas-Platte & Gulf P’ship v. Dow Chem. Co., 506 U.S. 910
(1992), adhered to by 981 F.2d 1177 (10th Cir. 1993); Etcheverry v. Tri-Ag
Serv., Inc., 993 P.2d 366 (Cal. 2000); Banks v. ICI Ams., Inc., 450 S.E.2d 671
(Ga. 1994); Kawamata Farms, Inc. v. United Agri Prods., 948 P.2d 1055 (Haw.
1997); Wright v. Am. Cyanamid Co., 599 N.W.2d 668 (Iowa 1999); Jenkins v.
Amchem Prods., Inc., 886 P.2d 869 (Kan. 1994), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 820
(1995); Hopkins v. Am. Cyanamid Co., 666 So. 2d 615 (La. 1996); Hochberg v.
Zoecon Corp., 657 N.E.2d 1263 (Mass. 1995); Goeb v. Tharaldson, 615 N.W.2d
800 (Minn. 2000); Eyl v. Ciba-Geigy Corp., 650 N.W.2d 744 (Neb. 2002);
Davidson v. Velsicol Chem. Corp., 834 P.2d 931 (Nev. 1992); Lewis v. Am.
Cyanamid Co., 715 A.2d 967 (N.J. 1998); Eide v. E.I. Du Pont de Nemours &
Co., 542 N.W.2d 769 (S.D. 1996); Quest Chem. Corp. v. Elam, 898 S.W.2d 819
(Tex. 1995); Goodwin v. Bacon, 896 P.2d 673 (Wash. 1995).
138. Compare Dow Agrosciences LLC v. Bates, 332 F.3d 323, 331-32 (5th
Cir. 2003), vacated and remanded, 125 S. Ct. 1788 (2005) (holding FIFRA does
preempt claims for crop damage because even though EPA has chosen not to
review product efficacy data, a judgment against the manufacturer would be
an incentive for it to alter its label to avoid future liability), Nathan Kimmel v.
DowElanco, 275 F.3d 1199, 1204-07 (9th Cir. 2002) (holding claim for
intentional interference with business advantage impliedly preempted by
FIFRA where claim was premised on manufacturer’s change in label so that
plaintiff’s pesticide bags could no longer be used with the product), and
Dahlman Farms, Inc. v. FMC Corp., 240 F. Supp. 2d 1012, 1019-21 (D. Minn.
2002) (same), with Kawamata Farms, Inc. v. United Agri. Prods., 948 P.2d
1055, 1078-80 (Haw. 1997) (finding no FIFRA preemption for voluntary label
statements), Walker v. Am. Cyanamid Co., 948 P.2d 1123, 1128 (Idaho 1997)
(same), Peterson v. BASF Corp., 675 N.W.2d 57, 70-71 (Minn. 2004), vacated,
125 S. Ct. 1968 (2005) (holding FIFRA did not preempt consumer fraud claim
based on allegations that manufacturer’s marketing of herbicides misled
farmers into believing that another cheaper herbicide by same manufacturer
could not be used on their crops), and American Cyanamid Co. v. Geye, 79
S.W.3d 21, 24-25 (Tex. 2002) (holding FIFRA does not preempt state law
claims for crop damage because EPA has chosen not to regulate product
effectiveness).
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c. A Renewed Judicial Role: Bates v. Dow Agrosciences, LLC
In April 2005, the Supreme Court decided Bates, a case in
which herbicide manufacturers sought a declaratory judgment
against Texas peanut farmers who were threatening to sue for
crop damage caused by the herbicide “Strongarm.”139 The
plaintiffs brought counterclaims including negligence, strict
liability, breach of warranties, and fraud.140 The District Court
for the Northern District of Texas found the plaintiffs’ state law
claims were preempted by FIFRA, and the Fifth Circuit Court
In finding the plaintiffs’ claims
of Appeals agreed.141
preempted, the court of appeals held that even when EPA has
not imposed a labeling requirement,142 for a state to authorize
recovery under any of the state law claims would clearly impose
a requirement “in addition to or different from” those required
under FIFRA, in part because it might cause the manufacturer
to seek a change in the label language.143
The Supreme Court disagreed.144 The decision, authored
by Justice Stevens, soundly rejected the Fifth Circuit’s broad
view of FIFRA preemption. The Court began by stating clearly
that nothing in FIFRA itself “would prevent a State from
making the violation of a federal labeling or packaging
requirement a state offense, thereby imposing its own sanctions
on pesticide manufacturers who violate federal law.”145 The
Court acknowledged that under Cipollone, the term
“requirements” in section 136v(b) of FIFRA reaches beyond
positive enactments, such as statutes or regulations, to
embrace judge-made rules or jury verdicts, but it is crucial to
determine the scope of that preemption.146 Thus, the Fifth
Circuit was “quite wrong when it assumed that any event, such
as a jury verdict, that might ‘induce’ a pesticide manufacturer
to change its label should be viewed as a requirement.”147
139. See Bates v. Dow Agrosciences LLC, 125 S. Ct. 1788, 1793 (2005).
140. See id.
141. See id.
142. Plaintiffs had argued that their common law claims were not related
to the pesticide label because the claims were based on the pesticide’s efficacy,
which EPA has expressly declined review in the registration process. See id.
at 1796.
143. Dow Agrosciences LLC v. Bates, 332 F.3d 323, 329 (5th Cir. 2003),
vacated and remanded, 125 S. Ct. 1788 (2005).
144. See Bates, 125 S. Ct. at 1804 (vacating and remanding the case).
145. Id. at 1797.
146. See id. at 1798.
147. Id.
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According to the Court, in order for a “requirement” to be
preempted it must be a requirement for “labeling or packaging”
and must be “in addition to or different from” those required
under FIFRA.148
In reviewing the plaintiffs’ state law claims, the Court held
that the common law claims for defective design, defective
manufacture, negligent testing, and breach of express warranty
were not requirements for “labeling or packaging” and thus,
were not preempted.149 Even if a verdict in favor of the
plaintiffs on such claims might induce the manufacturer to
alter its label, the Court rejected such an “effects-based” test,
choosing instead to focus on whether the elements of the
common law claim imposed labeling or packaging requirements
more burdensome than federal law.150 Indeed, the Court stated
that the threat of damages may give manufacturers an
additional reason to comply with federal requirements, and
private remedies to enforce federal misbranding requirements
“would seem to aid, rather than hinder, the functioning of
FIFRA.”151 The Court made clear that although FIFRA does
not provide a federal remedy to those injured by manufacturers’
violations of FIFRA’s requirements, “nothing in [section]
136v(b) precludes States from providing such a remedy.”152
The Court also looked to the “long history of tort litigation
against
manufacturers
of
poisonous
substances”
to
“emphasize[] the importance of providing an incentive to
manufacturers to use the utmost care in the business of
distributing inherently dangerous items.”153 The Court noted
with approval that common law tort suits could spur
148. Id. (citing 7 U.S.C. § 136v(b) (2000)).
149. Id.
150. See Bates, 125 S. Ct. at 1799. For instance, if state law claims for
fraud and failure to warn are equivalent to FIFRA’s requirements that a
pesticide label not contain “false or misleading” statements, 7 U.S.C. §
136(q)(1)(A) (2000), or inadequate instructions or warnings, 7 U.S.C. §
136(q)(1)(F), (G), such claims would not be preempted. See Bates, 125 S. Ct. at
1800.
151. Bates, 125 S. Ct. at 1800-02. The Court noted that the United States’
argument in favor of broad preemption in this case was “particularly dubious
given that just five years ago the United States advocated the interpretation
that we adopt today.” Id. at 1801 & n.24 (citations omitted).
152. Id. at 1801; see id. at 1800 (relying upon its earlier decision in
Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470 (1996), for the conclusion that state law
tort claims that imposed “parallel requirements” to FIFRA’s labeling
provisions were not preempted).
153. Bates, 125 S. Ct. at 1801-02.
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manufacturers to “gain more information about their products’
performance in diverse settings.”154 The Court concluded by
confirming that FIFRA did preempt competing state labeling
standards as well as “any statutory or common-law rule that
would impose a labeling requirement that diverges from those
set out in FIFRA and its implementing regulations.”155
The Supreme Court’s decision in Bates thus expressly
permits state legislatures and courts to create statutory and
common law damage remedies for violations of federal labeling
requirements or violations of state law requirements unrelated
to labeling. The decision has significant implications for
plaintiffs seeking to recover against pesticide manufacturers
for failure to conduct adequate testing or for defective design of
pesticides leading to the injury of children. While these claims
once would have been contained under the umbrella of
“labeling” claims preempted by FIFRA, they can now stand on
their own and provide incentives for manufacturers to conduct
appropriate testing for children’s health impacts or face the
alternative of potential damage awards at trial.
IV. THE COMMON LAW AND A CHILDREN’S HEALTH
AGENDA
Up until now, the children’s health agenda with regard to
pesticides has been played out mainly on the legislative and
regulatory front. Lawsuits were generally limited to those
against agencies to impact policy changes, as previously
discussed. Continued pursuit of policy improvements through
those channels remains crucial. However, developments in
FIFRA preemption and the common law as a result of Bates
makes common law tort claims against manufacturers a more
promising approach today than it was prior to the Court’s
decision.
Since Bates, there is little question that most negligent
testing and negligent design claims are not subject to FIFRA
preemption, as most of these claims are unrelated to the
pesticide label. Thus, this Section proposes a framework for
pursuing negligent testing and negligent design claims specific
to children’s health issues. Moreover, this Section argues that
154. Id. at 1802; see also Brief of Amici Curiae Natural Resources Defense
Council, et al. in Support of Petitioners, supra note 124, at 9 (quoting Letter
from Lynn R. Goldman, Assistant Administrator of Environmental Protection
Agency for Pesticides and Toxic Substances (Jan. 7, 1994)).
155. Bates, 125 S. Ct. at 1803.
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courts should recognize the precautionary principle embedded
in the FQPA and use it to exercise their discretion under
Daubert, allowing such cases to reach a jury. The burden of
proof should then be shifted to defendant manufacturers where
the lack of “ideal” data can be attributed to the defendant.
A. DEFECTIVE DESIGN AND NEGLIGENT TESTING CLAIMS
Even before the Bates decision, the majority of state and
federal courts around the country had held that unlike claims
for failure to warn or breach of warranty that were based on
alleged deficiencies in the pesticide label, claims for negligent
design or negligent testing not based on label defects were free
from FIFRA preemption.156 Although some other courts held
that if such a claim might have the “effect” of causing the
manufacturer to change the label, thereby preempting the
claim, such reliance on an “effects-based” test for preemption
appears to have been overruled by Bates.157
While each state formulates the cause of action slightly
differently, claims for defective design generally allege that
156. See, e.g., Ruiz-Guzman v. Amvac Chem. Corp., No. 98-35088, 2000 WL
1763212, at *1 (9th Cir. Nov. 28, 2000); Papas v. Upjohn Co., 985 F.2d 516,
520 (11th Cir. 1993); Worm v. Am. Cyanamid Co., 970 F.2d 1301, 1306 (4th
Cir. 1992); Jeffers v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 171 F. Supp. 2d 617, 621-25 (S.D.
W. Va. 2001); Lyall v. Leslie’s Poolmart, 984 F. Supp. 587, 595 (E.D. Mich.
1997); Reutzel v. Spartan Chem. Co., 903 F. Supp. 1272, 1281-82 (N.D. Iowa
1995); Helms v. Sporicidin Int’l., 871 F. Supp. 837, 842-44 (E.D.N.C. 1994);
Higgins v. Monsanto Co., 862 F. Supp. 751, 757-60 (N.D.N.Y. 1994); Burke v.
Dow Chem. Co., 797 F. Supp. 1128, 1141-42 (E.D.N.Y. 1992); Kennan v. Dow
Chem. Co., 717 F. Supp. 799, 811-12 (M.D. Fla. 1989); Arnold v. Dow Chem.
Co., 110 Cal. Rptr. 2d 722, 740-41 (Ct. App. 2001); Ackerman v. Am. Cyanamid
Co., 586 N.W.2d 208, 215-16 (Iowa 1998); Eide v. E.I. Du Pont de Nemours &
Co., 542 N.W.2d 769, 772 (S.D. 1996); All-Pure Chem. Co. v. White, 896 P.2d
697, 702 (Wash. 1995).
157. See, e.g., Hardin v. BASF Corp., 397 F.3d 1082, 1086 (8th Cir. 2005)
(holding defective design claim preempted as an indirect challenge to EPAapproved pesticide label); Netland v. Hess & Clark, Inc., 284 F.3d 895, 900
(8th Cir. 2002) (stating that the question to ask is “whether in seeking to avoid
liability for any error, would the manufacturer choose to alter the label or
product” (citing Worm v. Am. Cyanamid Co., 5 F.3d 744, 747-48 (4th Cir.
1993))); Akee v. Dow Chem. Co., 272 F. Supp. 2d 1112, 1131-32 (D. Haw. 2003)
(holding negligent testing and negligent design claims preempted as implied
attacks on the pesticide label). But see Bates v. Dow Agrosciences LLC, 125 S.
Ct. 1788, 1799 (2005) (rejecting “effects-based test” as having no support in
FIFRA which speaks only of “requirements” (citing 7 U.S.C. § 136v(b) (2000)));
Wuebker v. Wilbur-Ellis Co., 418 F.3d 883, 886-87 (8th Cir. 2005) (holding,
post-Bates, that FIFRA does not preempt plaintiff’s defective design claims
because legal rules underlying those claims do not require the defendant to
label or package the product in any particular way).
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either the product failed to perform safely when used in its
intended or reasonably foreseeable manner or the defendant
manufactured the pesticide knowing of the adverse health
impacts.158 Such claims are often coupled with claims for
negligent testing alleging that the manufacturer failed to
conduct appropriate testing in designing the product.159
In these cases, the remedy sought is not a change in the
label that would warn future users of the potential harms of
the product but a change in the design of the product itself.
Some jurisdictions allow at least two ways to establish a claim
for defective design—the consumer expectation test and the
risk-utility test.160 Under the consumer expectation test, the
fact-finder considers whether the product was unsafe to an
extent beyond that which would be contemplated by the
ordinary consumer. Because consumer expectations rest in
part on the product label, some courts held that defective
design claims based on the consumer expectation test are
preempted.161
158. See Jeffers v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 171 F. Supp. 2d 617, 620 (S.D. W.
Va. 2001) (articulating plaintiff’s design defect claim as being based on the fact
that even if pesticide was properly labeled in conformity with FIFRA, some
humans are particularly, but unknowingly, susceptible to harmful effects of
exposure to Dursban); Arnold v. Dow Chem. Co., 110 Cal. Rptr. 2d 722, 736
(Ct. App. 2001) (setting out design defect claim under California law);
Ackerman v. Am. Cyanamid Co., 586 N.W.2d 208, 215-16 (Iowa 1998)
(articulating that plaintiff’s defective design claim based on allegations that
proper design would have caused defendant to alter the product, not change
the label).
159. See, e.g., Bates, 125 S. Ct. 1788, 1798 (2005) (discussing defective
design and negligent testing cases together).
160. See, e.g., Ruiz-Guzman v. Amvac Chem. Corp., 7 P.3d 795, 798-800
(Wash. 2000) (setting out elements of both consumer expectation test and riskutility test for defective design claims under Washington law). But see
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 2 & cmt. G (1998)
(stating that under Restatement, consumer expectations do not constitute an
independent standard for judging the defectiveness of product designs); DAVID
G. OWEN, M. STUART MADDEN & MARY J. DAVIS, 1 MADDEN & OWEN ON
PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 8:3 (3rd ed. 2000) (“Although most modern courts have
abandoned consumer expectations as the basic test of design defectiveness . . .
some courts occasionally still use this test in certain cases, and the test is
legislatively prescribed in a small number of states.” (citations omitted)).
161. See, e.g., Ruiz-Guzman v. Amvac Chem. Corp., No. 98-35088, 2000 WL
1763212, at *1 (9th Cir. Nov. 28, 2000) (finding Washington’s consumer
expectation test preempted by FIFRA); Lescs v. Dow Chem. Co., 976 F. Supp.
393, 399 (W.D. Va. 1997) (holding defective design claim for alleged injuries
from Dursban based on consumer expectation test preempted by FIFRA). But
see Arnold, 110 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 742-45 (holding consumer expectation testing
not preempted); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY, supra
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However, there is authority based on the risk-utility test
and other more general formulations of a defective design claim
that can support such claims with regard to pesticides and
children. Generally, a product is defective under the riskutility test if the likelihood and seriousness of the plaintiff’s
harm outweighs the burden on the manufacturer to design a
product that would have prevented those harms and the
alternative design is both practical and feasible.162
For instance, in Ruiz-Guzman v. Amvac Chemical Corp.,163
apple farm workers sued the manufacturer of the pesticide
Phosdrin, which was used to control aphid infestations on
orchards, when they sustained toxic reactions after applying
the pesticide.164 The Washington Supreme Court accepted
certification of a question of state law from the Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals regarding whether a plaintiff may rely upon
an alternative product for purposes of a risk-utility test applied
under Washington law.165 The supreme court answered in the
affirmative, holding that the plaintiff could establish Phosdrin
was defectively designed and unreasonably dangerous based on
the availability of other pesticides, not simply the availability of
alternate formulations (designs) for the pesticide at issue.166
In so holding, the court stated that the plaintiff was
allowed to establish that safer pesticides could serve the same
purpose as the pesticide at issue, thus tending to show that
Phosdrin was defectively designed.167 Although the defendant
argued such alternatives were not reasonable because a
competitor had both owned the patent and allowed its EPA
registration to lapse, the court held that this did not mean the
defendant “was free to introduce an alternative means of killing
aphids with indifference to its greater risk of harming
note 160.
162. See Ruiz-Guzman, 7 P.3d at 798 (applying Washington law);
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY, supra note 160, § 2(b)
(noting that a product “is defective in design when the foreseeable risks of
harm . . . could have been reduced or avoided by the adoption of a reasonable
alternative design . . . and the omission of the alternative design renders the
product not reasonably safe”).
163. 7 P.3d 795 (Wash. 2000).
164. See id. at 797. Within a year after the plaintiffs sustained their
injuries, the State of Washington temporarily suspended the use of Phosdrin,
and the manufacturer requested that EPA cancel the registration. The
pesticide can no longer be used in the United States. See id.
165. See id.
166. See id. at 801.
167. See id. at 800.
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humans.”168 Moreover, the plaintiff was not obligated to prove
that the safer elements of the alternative product could be
incorporated into the defendant’s product, but only that other,
safer products were in fact reasonably available.169
Similarly, in a recent case from the District Court for the
Southern District of Alabama, the court held that a defective
design claim could proceed to trial when the plaintiff died after
allegedly inhaling toxic fumes from a floor cleaner containing
sulfuric and hydrochloric acid that she was using at home.170 In
analyzing the defective design claim, the court held the
plaintiff could prove that a safer, practical, alternative design
was available to the manufacturer when it manufactured the
product.171 In finding sufficient evidence for trial, the court
referred to testimony by both parties’ experts that the sulfuric
and hydrochloric acids in the product rendered the product
hazardous and that the product was unique among household
rust removers in containing those substances.172 Although the
court noted that exploration of the evidence would be necessary
at trial to determine whether the plaintiff could meet her
burden of proof, the evidence was sufficient to overcome the
defendant’s summary judgment motion.173
To the extent certain products pose more risks to children
than others, the risk-utility theory supports using the less
harmful products as evidence that the more harmful products
are defectively designed. For instance, numerous pesticides
including dieldrin, aminocarb, captan, carbaryl, lindane,
malathion, and dichlorophos can induce changes in the immune
and nervous systems, particularly those of infants and
children.174 To the extent other pesticide products that are not
immunotoxic or neurotoxic are reasonably available to control
target pests, such availability can be used to support the riskutility theory for a defective design claim.
In other defective design cases, courts have focused less on
168. Id.
169. See Ruiz-Guzman, 7 P.3d at 798.
170. See Gougler v. Sirius Prods., Inc., 370 F. Supp. 2d 1185, 1200 (S.D.
Ala. 2005).
171. See id.
172. See id.
173. See id.
174. See NRDC Comments, supra note 33, at 8 (citing WORLD HEATH ORG.,
WHO REGIONAL OFFICE FOR EUROPE AND EUROPEAN ENVIRONMENT AGENCY
PRESENT CHILDREN’S HEALTH AND ENVIRONMENT: A REVIEW OF EVIDENCE
(Apr. 2002)).
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the specific elements of the defective design claims and more on
the relationship between FIFRA and state tort law. For
instance, in Burke v. Dow Chemical Co.,175 the plaintiff alleged
that her twin children were born severely brain damaged after
she was exposed to Dursban when her home was sprayed to
exterminate insects.176 In denying the defendants’ motion for
summary judgment on the plaintiff’s tort claims,177 the District
Court for the Eastern District of New York began its analysis
by noting that protection of the public against toxic substances
has traditionally been a matter left to the states.178 Those
states, moreover, have developed rules to compensate for
injuries and “help deter injurious behavior in a complex
industrial environment,” where technology exceeds the average
person’s ability to protect against dangers.179 The court
contrasted this state system with federal legislation, which
does not have a comprehensive program to compensate persons
injured by hazardous products, and federal agencies, which
neither arrange for their own testing of products nor “put their
seal of approval” on products.180 As a result, consumers must
“still look to the great font of state tort law for protection
against harmful toxic substances.”181
In analyzing the plaintiff’s claims under the risk-utility
test for defective design, the court rejected the argument that
compliance with federal standards immunizes a manufacturer
from state tort liability. Simply because the EPA determines a
pesticide “will perform its intended function without
unreasonable adverse effects on the environment” does not
“supplant the state’s power to render a judgment as to the
relative risks and benefits of the product.”182 Moreover, the
court noted that with regard to testing, it is the applicants who
submit scientific data and draft product labels, and EPA does
not attempt to independently verify the test data provided.183
As a result, “EPA oversight will not be nearly as protective of

175.
176.
177.
178.
179.
180.
181.
182.
183.

797 F. Supp. 1128 (E.D.N.Y. 1992).
See id. at 1131.
See id. at 1134.
See id. at 1131-32.
Id. at 1132.
See id. at 1132.
Burke, 797 F. Supp. at 1132.
Id. at 1142 (quoting 7 U.S.C. § 136a(c)(5)(C)).
See Burke, 797 F. Supp. at 1132.
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persons exposed to pesticides as state tort law.”184
Similarly, in Arnold v. Dow Chemical Co.,185 the California
Court of Appeals held that the plaintiff’s defective design claim
was not preempted because it was based on the argument that
Dursban should not have been used in the plaintiff’s home
because it was unreasonably dangerous, its harms outweighed
the benefits, and the plaintiff’s birth defects could have been
prevented if Dursban had not been used.186 The court also
rejected the argument that simply because EPA registers the
pesticide at issue, the manufacturer can avoid a determination
that it is defectively designed under state law.187
Finally, in 1998 the Iowa Supreme Court held that claims
for negligent testing against a herbicide manufacturer for
alleged crop loss could go forward based on testimony from the
plaintiff’s expert that numerous studies were available to the
pesticide manufacturer showing the pesticide was not
adequately degradable in certain weather conditions.188
However, the manufacturer allegedly rushed the product onto
the market without sufficient testing so that farmers would
purchase its product instead of that of its competitors.189 In
reaching its holding, the court rejected the manufacturer’s
argument that the plaintiff should “lose his claim on the merits
because testing is so closely superintended by EPA.”190
Instead, the court held that such cases should only be
dismissed on a showing that the agency in fact “supplanted the
manufacturer in matters of design and testing.”191
Indeed, the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals articulated these
same principles—that state tort law retains an important role
despite the federal regulation of pesticides—in the Ferebee case
decided in 1984,192 which the Bates opinion cited with
approval.193 In Ferebee, the court of appeals affirmed a verdict
for the plaintiff on his claim that long-term exposure to the

184.
185.
186.
187.
188.
1998).
189.
190.
191.
192.
193.

Id. at 1135.
110 Cal. Rptr. 2d 722 (Ct. App. 2001).
See id. at 738.
See id. at 746.
See Ackerman v. Am. Cyanamid Co., 586 N.W.2d 208, 215 (Iowa
See id.
Id. at 216.
Id.
See Ferebee v. Chevron Chem. Co., 736 F.2d 1529 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
See Bates v. Dow Agrosciences LLC, 125 S. Ct. 1788, 1802 (2005).
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pesticide paraquat led to his contracting pulmonary fibrosis,
and Chevron had failed to warn him of the dangers.194 The
court focused both on Chevron’s knowledge of the dangers of
paraquat at the time the plaintiff used the product and the
relationship between state tort law and FIFRA.195 With regard
to Chevron’s knowledge, the court found it highly relevant that
Chevron had known the pesticide could cause the type of lung
disease the plaintiff suffered and that the pesticide selectively
attacks the lungs when it enters the body.196 The court also
focused on the reports and data in Chevron’s files regarding
other incidents of paraquat exposure and held that such
knowledge imparted a legal duty.197
As for the relationship between state tort law and FIFRA,
the court rejected the argument that EPA’s registration of
paraquat constituted an expert, federal determination that the
product did not pose an unreasonable risk to the normal
user.198 Instead, the court recognized that the purpose of
FIFRA is to ensure that, from a cost-benefit point of view,
paraquat as labeled does not produce “unreasonable adverse
effects on the environment” while state tort law “may have
broader, compensatory goals.”199 Indeed, EPA was required to
assign a “cost value” to the pesticide’s risks and estimate the
benefits at large to society, but there is no need for a court or a
jury to “strike the same balance on these difficult questions as
EPA.”200 The court went on to note that assignment “of values
to such ‘soft’ variables as human health is among the most
difficult tasks faced in a regulatory society.”201
Finally, the court stated that tort recovery may also
encourage plaintiffs to bring suits for injuries “not previously
recognized as traceable” to the pesticide at issue which may
“aid in the exposure of new dangers associated with
pesticides.”202 Successful lawsuits of this kind may lead
manufacturers to change their labeling or registration with
EPA or cause EPA itself to require changes. Moreover, the
194.
195.
196.
197.
198.
199.
200.
201.
202.

See Ferebee, 736 F.2d at 1532.
See id. at 1536, 1539.
See id. at 1536-38.
See id. at 1537.
See id. at 1540.
Id.
Ferebee, 736 F.2d at 1540.
Id.
Id. at 1541.
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threat of damages actions may provide manufacturers with
added “dynamic incentives to continue to keep abreast of all
possible injuries stemming from use of their product so as to
forestall such actions through product improvement.”203 It was
this language in the Ferebee case that the Supreme Court cited
with approval in Bates.204
Although Ferebee was rarely cited, except with disapproval,
between the 1992 Cipollone decision and the 2005 Bates
decision,205 the Supreme Court’s positive reference to the case
bodes well for efforts to utilize state tort actions, particularly
defective design and negligent testing claims. Such claims,
which will very seldom be subject to FIFRA preemption, can be
used to pursue relief on behalf of children injured by pesticides
and play a role in prompting manufacturers to engage in
additional testing to defend against liability or remove those
products from the market. Indeed, in Bates, the Supreme
Court had little difficulty holding that rules requiring
manufacturers to use due care in both conducting appropriate
testing of their products and designing products in a reasonably
safe manner are not subject to preemption and can provide
incentives for better testing and products.206
B. USING BATES AND THE FQPA TO PROMOTE CHILDREN’S
HEALTH IN THE COURTS BY SHIFTING THE BURDEN OF PROOF
While the obstacle of FIFRA preemption has certainly
lessened in the wake of Bates, the scientific evidence barriers
remain, and plaintiffs still need to get past Daubert motions to
obtain compensation and help shape corporate behavior in the
future. Thus, one remaining question is how scientists and
nonprofit groups, who have previously focused their efforts on
encouraging EPA to set more protective standards, can now
turn some of those efforts to tort law to help impose those
standards through the courts.
First, significant evidence has been gathered since the
1993 NAS study showing the risk pesticides pose to children.
Some of this evidence is general, and other evidence is more
specific—either to disease outcomes or to chemicals. For

203. Id. at 1541-42.
204. See Bates v. Dow Agrosciences LLC, 125 S. Ct. 1788, 1802 (2005).
205. See, e.g., MacDonald v. Monsanto Co., 27 F.3d 1021 (5th Cir. 1994);
DerGazarian v. Dow Chem. Co., 836 F. Supp. 1429 (W.D. Ark. 1993).
206. See Bates, 125 S. Ct. at 1798, 1802.

KLASS_FINAL_120.DOC

2005]

01/09/2006 12:41:34 PM

PESTICIDES, CHILDREN’S HEALTH, AND TORT

133

instance, researchers have linked environmental toxicant
exposure to higher rates of low birth weight, intellectual
impairment, and behavioral problems,207 but EPA currently
does not require “development neurotoxicity testing” using even
animal experiments to provide information on how a particular
chemical impacts the fetal and newborn nervous system.208 In
its most recent proposed regulations setting data requirements
for pesticide registration, EPA included tests for developmental
neurotoxicity (DNT). Such tests are not a “core” requirement
but only a “conditional requirement” if other tests (which
generally are less sensitive) show indications that the pesticide
may result in development neurotoxicity.209 Because EPA does
not require this testing in connection with pesticide and other
chemical registration, the most basic toxicity tests in animals
are lacking for seventy-five percent of the 3,000 highest
production chemicals, despite the fact that EPA acknowledges
that over 140 registered pesticides are neurotoxic.210
At the same time, the European Union is proposing a much
stricter regulatory framework for industrial chemicals. Under
the proposal, both European and non-European manufacturers
doing business in Europe would be required to submit
extensive toxicity data for tens of thousands of chemicals on the
market.211 That such testing protocols are currently available
and such data will soon exist in regulatory systems outside the
United States can be used to support both negligent testing
claims and defective design claims on grounds that such testing
is reasonably available and would likely result in safer
chemicals being designed and used in the United States.212
207. See Lanphear, supra note 1, at 203.
208. See id. at 205; see also SCHETTLER ET AL., supra note 108, at 108-12
(discussing lack of toxicity data for registered chemicals and noting that “[i]t is
not that there is a lack of accepted methods for testing developmental
neurotoxicity”); WALLINGA, supra note 4, at 61 (discussing a developmental
neurotoxicity study and stating that even though the study was extensively
validated years ago, EPA has received data from development neurotoxicity
testing for only six pesticides, with no such data on the many pesticides in use
already known to be toxic to the nervous system).
209. See, e.g., Pesticides: Data Requirement for Conventional Chemicals,
70 Fed. Reg. 12,276, 12,343-45 (Mar. 11, 2005) (showing DNT as conditionally
required and setting forth those conditions); Learning Disabilities Ass’n of
America, Comments Re: 40 CFR Parts 152 and 158 at 3-6,
http://www.epa.gov/edocket (Docket ID No. OPP-2004-0387).
210. See Lanphear, supra note 1, at 204.
211. See REACH, supra note 36.
212. See WALLINGA, supra note 4, at 61-62 (discussing the fact that the
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Indeed, while EPA may or may not choose to regulate based on
data collected in European countries, there is no reason such
evidence would not be admissible in litigation.
Moreover, there is a growing call among academics,
scientists, and policymakers that Daubert and our current tort
system generally is contributing to an “environmental and
human health crisis.”213 Some have proposed that the burden
of proof in toxic tort cases be modified where chemicals,
including pesticides, are released into the environment and the
manufacturer has failed to conduct the type of studies that
would help prove or disprove a causal link between the
chemical and physical harm.214 In those circumstances, it
would be the defendant manufacturer, not the plaintiff, who
would bear the burden of scientific uncertainty.215 In other
words, “proof of a failure to discover and disseminate adequate
health information about a substance stands in for proof of
causation of harm.”216 Thus, once the plaintiff makes a prima
facie showing that the defendant released an inadequately
investigated chemical into the environment and the plaintiff
was exposed to that chemical, the defendant could avoid
liability by disproving general causation or showing the
plaintiff’s illness was caused by other factors.217
While such proposals may be appealing to those who are
developmental neurotoxicity study protocol to assess the effects of pesticides
on the developing brain and nervous system has been extensively validated for
years, but EPA still does not require developmental neurotoxicity data for
most pesticides, even those already known to be toxic to the nervous system).
213. See, e.g., Lynda M. Collins, Strange Bedfellows? The Precautionary
Principle and Toxic Tort: A Tort Paradigm for the 21st Century, 35 ENVTL. L.
REP. 10,361, 10,361-62 (2005); see also JOE THORNTON, PANDORA’S POISON:
CHLORINE, HEALTH, AND A NEW ENVIRONMENTAL STRATEGY 117-20 (2000);
George P. Lakoff, A Cognitive Scientist Looks at Daubert, 95 AM. J. PUB.
HEALTH S114, S116-S117 (Supp. 1 2005) (arguing that Daubert and Joiner
allow the judge, not the jury, to decide the case, discourage scientists from
testifying at trial, and remove inherent fairness in the trial process).
214. See Collins, supra note 213, at 10,370.
215. See id.; see also Margaret A. Berger, Eliminating General Causation:
Notes Towards a New Theory of Justice and Toxic Torts, 97 COLUM. L. REV.
2117, 2133-34, 2143 (1997) (proposing to eliminate the general causation
requirement in toxic tort cases and imposing liability on defendants for failure
to provide substantial information relating to risk); Lynda Collins, Material
Contribution to Risk and Causation in Toxic Torts, 11 J. ENVTL. L. & PRAC.
105, 140 (2001); James M. Olson, Shifting the Burden of Proof: How the
Common Law Can Safeguard Nature and Promote an Earth Ethic, 20 ENVTL.
L. 891 (1990).
216. Collins, supra note 213, at 10,370.
217. See id.
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frustrated with the inability of plaintiffs to prevail in many
meritorious cases, they also are a significant departure from
current tort law doctrine without any statutory or common law
basis to support such a radical shift. Some may also criticize
the fairly low burden placed on the plaintiff (mere exposure) to
qualify for entitlement to shift the burden of proof.
Although these are obviously difficult issues, they seem
somewhat less difficult in the context of pesticides and
children’s health because of the statutory support in the FQPA
and because pesticide manufacturers are in the best position to
provide the necessary scientific data.218 Although FIFRA
provides for a cost-benefit analysis in registering pesticides, the
FQPA imposes an overlay of the precautionary principle when
it comes to children’s health impacts, as earlier discussed.
While one may argue this should only apply to the tolerance
standards EPA sets for individual pesticides, there is a good
argument that the statute itself sets a different policy direction
for scientific uncertainty when it comes to children’s health in
general. The statute, along with basic principles of fairness,
provide ample room to consider some measure of burdenshifting in at least this narrow category of cases, allowing
judges to err on the side of letting cases involving children’s
health go to the jury in the absence of “perfect” data
establishing causation.
The task, then, is to create a judicial framework for state
common law tort claims in which courts can evaluate not only
the available scientific evidence but also any limitations on
that evidence, such as the ethical concerns regarding testing on
humans discussed earlier. The court could also evaluate the
defendant’s failure to undertake reasonable and available
testing. Once the defendant’s failure to undertake reasonable
testing becomes relevant in response to a Daubert challenge, as
well as causation in general, courts will become better educated
with regard to evaluating the benefits and shortcomings of
different types of scientific evidence (such as epidemiological
versus various animal studies). Moreover, this inquiry has the
potential to place significant incentives on pesticide
manufacturers to conduct any testing identified by plaintiffs to
avoid any burden-shifting in the case.
Courts could thus implement the following framework.
The plaintiff would establish at a pretrial hearing initiated by
218. See id.
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the plaintiff or in response to a Daubert challenge that testing
protocols are available or could reasonably be developed to test
for the harm suffered by the plaintiff, but the defendant has
neither conducted such testing nor shown similar data through
other testing mechanisms that already exist. At that point, the
plaintiff, through the introduction of expert testimony on the
negligent testing issue, will have satisfied his burden under
Daubert, or the applicable state standard, and the court would
then shift the burden of proof on causation to the defendant at
trial. In other words, the plaintiff would be entitled to a
rebuttable presumption that the defendant’s failure to conduct
the testing was negligent, and that the testing would have
resulted in data not already available that would cause a
reasonable manufacturer to take the pesticide off the market or
use a less harmful design that would not have caused the
plaintiff’s injury.
The process proposed here is not as sweeping or as
comprehensive as the burden-shifting proposals previously
discussed with regard to hazardous chemicals in general.
However, the proposal outlined here has several benefits.
First, it draws upon some statutory support, the FQPA, where
the precautionary principle is strong. Second, it is within a
process similar to a Daubert hearing, with which courts and
litigants are already familiar. Third, it is a much less radical
departure from current tort law jurisprudence because
uncertainty alone is not enough to shift the burden of proof.
Instead, the plaintiff must point to specific testing or data
collection for evidence not already available through other
means that the manufacturer could have conducted to shift the
burden of proof. While this proposal is certainly a smaller step
and would apply in a much narrower category of cases, it is a
step that may be easier for courts to actually implement within
our current jurisprudential framework.
Such
a
framework
would
encourage
pesticide
manufacturers to engage in reasonably available testing not
already required by EPA in order to meet its burden to disprove
causation. This would place the burden of collecting scientific
data regarding the pesticide on the party in the best position to
bear it.
When one considers that it is the defendant
manufacturer who has introduced the pesticide into the stream
of commerce and is collecting the profits, such a framework
does not seem unreasonable. Doing so would allow the tort
system to work as the Supreme Court promised in Bates—to
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put additional pressure on manufacturers to investigate and
improve their products or be subject to potential liability in the
face of scientific uncertainty they are in the best position to
remedy.219
C. THE PROMISE OF BURDEN-SHIFTING: PROPOSITION 65 AND
CERCLA
California Proposition 65, or the Safe Drinking Water and
Toxic Enforcement Act of 1986,220 illustrates that shifting the
burden of proof in civil liability cases can create sufficient
incentives for manufacturers to collect and make available
valuable data on environmental health risks and causation.
The law is most well-known for the requirement that
businesses give “clear and reasonable warning” to anyone they
expose to chemicals known to cause cancer or reproductive
toxicity.221 Such warnings must be attached to the product
itself, prominently displayed where the product is sold or used,
or conveyed to the public in other ways through notices in the
public news media, provided the warning is “clear and
reasonable.”222
Businesses have had great difficulty complying with the
warning requirements for environmental exposures, because
they are forced to determine the affected area of emissions as
well as the appropriate method of warning under the
circumstances for all chemicals subject to the law.223 Penalties
219. See Bates v. Dow Agrosciences LLC, 125 S. Ct. 1788, 1801-02 (2005).
220. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 25249.5-.13 (2004). California voters
adopted the law by ballot initiative in 1986. See Michael Barsa, Note,
California’s Proposition 65 and the Limits of Information Economics, 49 STAN.
L. REV. 1223, 1223-24 (1997).
221. See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 25249.6; see also Bradley C.
Karkkainen, Information-Forcing Environmental Regulation, 33 FLA. ST. U. L.
REV. (forthcoming 2005); Clifford Rechtschaffen, The Warning Game:
Evaluating Warnings Under California’s Proposition 65, 23 ECOLOGY L.Q. 303
(1996); Barsa, supra note 220, at 1227-35.
222. See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 25249.6, 25249.11(f); see also
Ingredient Commc’ns Council, Inc. v. Lungren, 2 Cal. App. 4th. 1480, 1495-96
(Ct. App. 1992) (holding toll-free telephone information system does not per se
satisfy the warning requirement for use of chemicals covered by the law).
223. See CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 22, § 12601 (2002); see also Consumer Cause,
Inc. v. Smilecare, 110 Cal. Rptr. 2d 627, 644-45 (Ct. App. 2001) (reversing
summary judgment for defendant in case where defendant dental care
providers were alleged to have violated Proposition 65 for failing to warn of
mercury contained in “silver filling” dental amalgam because providers had
not contended that they had performed a qualitative risk assessment, as was
their burden, to establish the numeric level for “no observable reproductive
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for providing an insufficient warning, which is an issue of fact
for the jury, are up to $2,500 per day, and private citizens as
well as the government may initiate a suit for an alleged
violation.224
The law’s relevance to this Article is the exemption it
provides to businesses to avoid these indeterminate warning
requirements. The law states in relevant part that a warning
is not required for any discharge or release where the
responsible person can show the exposure poses “no significant
risk” of cancer, assuming a lifetime exposure at the level in
question, and the exposure will have “no observable effect” with
regard to reproductive toxicity, assuming exposure at 1000
times the level in question.225 Thus, to avoid the potential legal
liability imposed by the law’s warning requirements, the
burden is placed on the manufacturer or other business to
establish based on “evidence and standards of comparable
scientific validity”226 that the chemical poses no significant risk
or no observable reproductive effect.
In order to take advantage of this exception to the warning
requirement, the law authorizes California’s Office of
Environmental Health and Hazard Assessment (OEHHA)227 to
establish numerical exposure thresholds that will constitute
the statutory “no significant risk” standards.228 However, the
burden is placed on businesses to provide adequate data to the
regulators to convince them to set such numerical
thresholds.229 Thus, the law has “shifted the burden of proof”
to the business sector to provide sufficient scientific data to
avoid the threat of liability from a multitude of lawsuits over
inadequate warnings.
In doing so, California has given significant incentives to
the business and manufacturing sector to collect data and
provide it to regulators in order to set numeric standards as
quickly as possible for a whole host of chemicals to show that
their emissions are under the “no risk” levels and thus “safe.”230
effects” from mercury).
224. See CAL. HEATH & SAFETY CODE § 25249.7.
225. See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 25249.10(c).
226. Id.
227. See CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 22, pmbl. (2002).
228. See id. at tit. 22, § 12701.
229. See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 25249.10(c) (2004) (“In any action
brought to enforce Section 25249.6, the burden of showing that an exposure
meets the criteria of this subdivision shall be on the defendant.”).
230. See CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 22, § 12703 (setting forth Quantitative Risk
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This is very different from the current framework under federal
pesticide law and other environmental health and safety laws,
where the government and private plaintiffs bear the burden of
collecting data to either set regulatory standards or prove the
product has caused harm in the context of a lawsuit.
Under Proposition 65, California has received sufficient
scientific data to establish nearly 300 numeric standards for
toxic pollutants without any legal challenge, prompting a
review panel to state that “by federal standards, Proposition 65
has resulted in 100 years of progress in the areas of hazard
identification, risk assessment and exposure assessment.”231
Thus, California’s system creates uncertainty and legal liability
for product manufacturers and their customers and then places
the burden of proof on them to provide the data to set safety
standards for those products to avoid that uncertainty and
potential liability.
Other examples of burden-shifting in the environmental
law and toxic tort context exist as well. For instance, even
though the Comprehensive Environmental Response,
Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA)232 does not
expressly state that it imposes strict, joint, and several liability
on owners, operators, arrangers, and transporters of hazardous
substances, courts have interpreted the law to impose such
liability.233 As a result, once the plaintiff establishes that the
defendant falls within one of the classes of persons subject to
potential liability, each defendant bears the burden of
disproving that its actions resulted in a release of a hazardous
substance.234 As one court has stated, even though placing the
burden of proof with regard to causation and divisibility of
harm may result in many defendants paying more than their
Assessment requirements to determine the level of exposure that constitutes
“no significant risk” of cancer for a chemical); §§ 12701-12711 (authorizing
agency adoption of “no significant risk” levels for carcinogens); §§ 12801-12805
(authorizing agency adoption of acceptable exposure levels for reproductive
toxicants).
231. Barsa, supra note 220, at 1240; see also Clifford Rechtschaffen, How to
Reduce Lead Exposures with One Simple Statute: The Experience of
Proposition 65, 29 Envtl. L Rep. (Envtl. Law Inst.) 10,581, 10,581 (1999)
(stating that Proposition 65 “has spurred faster and more significant lead
reductions than federal law by prompting companies to reformulate products
and change their manufacturing processes”).
232. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (2000).
233. See PERCIVAL ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION: LAW, SCIENCE,
AND POLICY 257-58 (4th ed. 2003).
234. See id. at 258.
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fair share, “Congress intended for those proven at least
partially culpable to bear the cost of the uncertainty.”235
D. EXAMPLES OF COMMON LAW BURDEN-SHIFTING
While the examples above show how statutory burdenshifting can create real incentives for chemical manufacturers
and others to produce valuable data, some may question
whether it is appropriate for courts to shift the burden of proof
to create such incentives as a matter of common law. However,
a review of the case law reveals that courts have relied on the
common law to shift the burden of proof to promote important
policy goals, even in the absence of a statutory mandate like
that found in Proposition 65.
For instance, in the tort law context, the landmark cases of
Summers v. Tice236 and Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories237 show
courts using their authority under the common law to place the
burden of proof on the party best able to bear it. In Summers,
the plaintiff sought recovery for an eye injury from two
hunters, both of whom were hunting and only one of whom hit
the plaintiff with a shot.238 The trial court held that both
defendants were liable for negligence, and that the plaintiff
was not contributorily negligent.239 On appeal, the defendants
argued that because they were not acting in concert, they were
not joint tortfeasors and could not be held jointly and severally
liable.240 In rejecting this argument, the California Supreme
Court held that ordinarily “defendants are in a far better
position to offer evidence to determine which one caused the
injury,” and principles of “policy and justice” supported shifting
the burden of proof on both causation and allocation of damages
to the defendants.241 The court further reasoned that if
determining causation and proper apportionment of damages
was difficult or incapable of proof, “the innocent wronged party
should not be deprived of his right to redress,” and “the
wrongdoers are not in a position to complain of uncertainty.”242
235. O’Neil v. Picillo, 883 F.2d 176, 179 (1st Cir. 1989).
236. 199 P.2d 1 (Cal. 1948).
237. 607 P.2d 924 (Cal. 1980).
238. See Summers, 199 P.2d at 1-2.
239. See id. at 2.
240. See id.
241. Id. at 4-5.
242. Id. at 5; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 433B(3) (1965)
(adopting rule from Summers).
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In Sindell, the named plaintiff in a class sought damages
against drug companies seeking to recover for injuries
sustained as a result of her mother taking the drug
diethylstilbesterol (DES) during pregnancy.243 The plaintiff
was able to identify the drug involved but not the manufacturer
On appeal from the
of the precise product ingested.244
dismissal of the action, the California Supreme Court began
with the proposition that generally, imposition of liability
depends on the plaintiff’s ability to show that an act by the
The court then noted
defendant caused her injuries.245
exceptions to this rule, such as the rule of Summers v. Tice,
market-based liability, and concert of action theories, but
concluded that none of those theories could help the plaintiff
because she had not joined all of 200 or more DES
manufacturers in the lawsuit.246
However, the court held that despite the absence of an
existing theory of recovery for the plaintiff, the court was not
willing to affirm the lower court’s dismissal, noting that “[i]n
our contemporary complex industrialized society, advances in
science and technology create fungible goods which may harm
consumers and which cannot be traced to any specific
producer.”247 The court went on to proclaim that “[t]he
response of the courts can be either to adhere rigidly to prior
doctrine, denying recovery to those injured by such products, or
to fashion remedies to meet these changing needs.”248 The
court proceeded to set out a modified theory of market share
liability that shifted the burden to the defendants to prove that
they could not have caused the plaintiff’s harm once the
plaintiff established negligence or strict liability with regard to
the drug in general.249 This theory was based in part on a 1978
article in the Fordham Law Review setting forth a framework
for liability in DES cases.250 Thus, the court concluded that as
between an innocent plaintiff and negligent defendants, the
latter should bear the cost of the injury and that “[f]rom a

243. See Sindell, 607 P.2d at 925.
244. See id. at 926.
245. See id. at 928.
246. See id. at 930-35.
247. Id. at 936.
248. Id.
249. See Sindell, 607 P.2d at 936-37.
250. See id. at 927, 936-38 (citing Comment, DES and a Proposed Theory of
Enterprise Liability, 46 FORDHAM L. REV. 963 (1978)).
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broader policy standpoint,” defendants were better able to bear
the cost of injury resulting from the creation of a defective
product.251
Although courts have not universally adopted the rules set
out in Summers and Sindell,252 these decisions are significant
as examples of courts using the common law to shift the burden
of proof when plaintiffs are not at fault for the lack of evidence
on causation and the defendants are in a better position to bear
that risk.
Such use of burden-shifting to develop the common law is
not limited to the tort arena. In the famous case of O’Keeffe v.
Snyder,253 the New Jersey Supreme Court determined that a
strict application of the doctrine of adverse possession should
no longer apply to cases involving recovery of chattels.254 The
court reasoned that the existing adverse possession rule, which
placed the burden of proof on the adverse possessor to show her
possession was hostile, actual, visible, exclusive, and
continuous, was unworkable in the context of personal
property, which is often kept in a home or other private
place.255 The facts of this case involved an alleged theft of a
Georgia O’Keeffe painting that was later transferred to a bona
fide purchaser.256 In that context, the court found that a
burden of establishing a continuous public display of a work of
art to obtain rights of possession after expiration of the statute
of limitations for replevin would impose too a heavy burden on
the purchaser, who wished to enjoy the painting in her own
home.257
The court thus modified the common law doctrine to place
251. See Sindell, 607 P.2d at 936; see also Beshada v. Johns-Manville
Prods. Corp., 447 A.2d 539, 549 (N.J. 1982) (shifting burden of proof on
causation to defendant in asbestos litigation case because manufacturer had
been in a position to conduct additional safety research and had failed to do
so); Mary L. Lyndon, Information Economics and Chemical Toxicity: Designing
Laws to Produce and Use Data, 87 MICH. L. REV. 1795, 1817-18 (1989)
(discussing Beshada case in the context of product liability rules and statutory
frameworks that can be used to provide incentives to manufacturers to collect
improved toxicity data on their chemicals and products).
252. See DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS 428-32 (2000) (providing
examples of courts placing strict limits on application of rule in Summers and
Sindell or rejecting the doctrines altogether).
253. 416 A.2d 862 (N.J. 1980).
254. See id. at 872.
255. See id. at 871.
256. See id. at 865-66.
257. See id. at 871.
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the burden of proof on the plaintiff to show she had taken
diligent steps to investigate and recover the painting or other
chattel.258 In altering the doctrine, the court was persuaded
“that the introduction of equitable considerations through the
discovery rule provides a more satisfactory response than the
doctrine of adverse possession.”259 The court was very clear
that its decision was a departure from prior doctrine and stated
that the decision “not only changes the requirements for
acquiring title to personal property . . . but also shifts the
burden of proof” to the owner, as the one seeking the benefit of
the discovery rule.260 Thus, the New Jersey court, like the
California courts in Summers and Sindell, used the common
law to shape a doctrine that better reflected the realities and
social policy concerns of the day.261
There is ample precedent, then, for state common law to
take on this issue and use principles of burden-shifting to allow
innocent plaintiffs to obtain compensation and force defendants
to bear the burden of insufficient data, thereby creating
incentives to obtain better data. Moreover, there is no reason
that state common law courts cannot use the existence of the
FQPA as an additional reason to support a move in favor of
shifting the burden of proof as a matter of state common law.
Indeed, the scholarly literature and Supreme Court decisions
have historically recognized the use of statutory developments
to support a shift in the common law. As the Supreme Court
has stated, “[i]t has always been the duty of the common-law
court to perceive the impact of major legislative innovations
and to interweave the new legislative policies with the
inherited body of common-law principles.”262
258. See id. at 872.
259. O’Keeffe, 416 A.2d at 872.
260. Id. at 873.
261. See BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS
152 (1921) (“If judges have wofully [sic] misinterpreted the mores of their day,
or if the mores of their day are no longer those of ours, they ought not to tie, in
helpless submission, the hands of their successors.”). “I think that when a
rule, after it has been duly tested by experience, has been found to be
inconsistent with the sense of justice or with the social welfare, there should
be less hesitation in . . . full abandonment.” Id. at 150.
262. Moragne v. States Marine Lines, Inc., 398 U.S. 375, 392 (1970); see
WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR. & PHILIP P. FRICKEY, CASES AND MATERIALS ON
LEGISLATION: STATUTES AND THE CREATION OF PUBLIC POLICY 398-406 (2d
ed. 1995) (presenting Moragne in the context of discussing statutes as a source
of policy norms); Frank E. Horack, Jr., The Common Law of Legislation, 23
IOWA L. REV. 41, 54 (1937) (arguing that courts should “use the statutory
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Following from this precedent, there is increasing evidence
that courts do in fact apply principles contained in federal and
state environmental statutes when developing common law
principles in the area of environmental law. For instance, even
though strict liability has been losing ground among courts in
favor of negligence theory as a general matter, the trend in
environmental contamination cases appears to be the
opposite.263 This is because since the enactment of CERCLA in
1980, courts have become increasingly more comfortable
applying strict liability in contamination cases as a result of the
judicial interpretations of CERCLA described above. A review
of the case law shows that these same courts have used
CERCLA to develop the common law doctrine of strict liability
and to apply that standard of liability more frequently in
environmental cases.264 There is an equal ability within the
common law tort system to place a similar incentive on
manufacturers to collect and evaluate scientific data.
For burden-shifting to succeed in the context of a toxic tort
case, however, nonprofit groups and academics in this area
must work more closely with plaintiffs’ lawyers to help provide
the testimony and background on scientific uncertainty in the
context of the FQPA plaintiffs’ need to pursue their cases.
Nonprofit organizations and academic institutions are in a
unique position in that they often have access to scientists who
can explain to the courts the level of scientific uncertainty in
this area, the reasons behind it, and the reasonably available
testing protocols. Such expertise can benefit the FQPA and
FIFRA regulatory process along with lawsuits against EPA.
Scientists can help ensure that courts hear and understand the
evidence that does exist regarding the impact of pesticides on
development as a guide in determining shifting social policy and shifting
administrative demands”); see also James McCauley Landis, Statutes and the
Sources of Law, in HARVARD LEGAL ESSAYS 213, 230 (1934) (arguing that
common law courts should look to the legislative process to “strike a more
favorable balance between legislative and judicial development of law”).
Judge Guido Calabresi cites Landis and takes his position one step further,
arguing that courts should be able to exercise their common law powers over
statutes by revising them where appropriate or forcing legislatures to act,
rather than being limited to interpreting existing statutory language or
invalidating statutes based on constitutional grounds. See GUIDO CALABRESI,
A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES 81-92 (1982).
263. See generally Alexandra B. Klass, From Reservoirs to Remediation:
The Impact of CERCLA on Common Law Strict Liability Environmental
Claims, 39 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 903 (2004).
264. See id. at 942-57.
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children’s health and the reasons for the lack of certain types of
data.
Moreover, while efforts to shape the law in this direction
can start with children’s claims because of the “hook” of the
FQPA, any positive developments can be used to potentially
expand burden-shifting more broadly to encompass a wider
group of plaintiffs harmed by pesticides or other toxic
chemicals. In this way, the law can develop in a manner
similar to that in Summers and Sindell, in that courts first
become comfortable with burden-shifting in a narrow category
of cases (in Summers, a very limited number of potential
defendants, all of whom are known) and then allow such
expansion to other types of cases as justified (in Sindell, a
larger number of defendants, some of whom are unknown).
While state common law tort law claims are a less direct
approach than compelling EPA to set appropriate testing and
design standards, the administrative law and political barriers
to such efforts suggest that state tort law, which has often been
ignored in recent decades by the volume of federal
environmental statutes and regulations, still has an important
role to play in regulating environmental harms.265 Indeed, the
tort law system has always been and can continue to be a
vehicle to force pesticide manufacturers to fully take the costs
of children’s health into account in analyzing which products to
place on the market and to conduct the scientific studies
necessary to ensure their safety.266

265. See, e.g., Andrew P. Morriss, Lessons for Environmental Law from the
American Codification Debate, in THE COMMON LAW AND THE ENVIRONMENT:
RETHINKING THE STATUTORY BASIS FOR MODERN ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 130,
154 (Roger E. Meiners & Andrew P. Morriss eds., 2000) (noting that the
common law is “much superior to statutory law in controlling the role of
interest groups” and should not be abandoned in efforts to protect the
environment).
266. See, e.g., Ileto v. Glock Inc., 370 F.3d 860, 868 (9th Cir. 2004)
(Kozinski, J., concurring) (“Imposing novel tort theories on economic activity
significantly affects the risks of engaging in that activity, and thus alters the
cost and availability of the activity within the forum jurisdiction.”); Berger,
supra note 215, at 2119 (stating that reforms relating to the plaintiff’s burden
of proof on causation “furthers tort law’s corrective justice rationale that
liability is linked to moral responsibility”); Collins, supra note 213, at 10,362
(“Thus, more than its statutory sibling, tort has the potential to actually
change the economic equation – making it cheaper to protect than to pollute
the environment.”).
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V. CONCLUSION
A review of the regulatory and legal history of the Food
Quality Protection Act of 1996 shows that although the law was
heralded with great expectations, its implementation has not
yet created a sufficient structure to significantly aid in
protecting children from harmful pesticide exposure. Moreover,
targeted lawsuits against EPA to improve implementation of
the FQPA’s key provisions have had little success as a result of
procedural administrative law hurdles.
However, recent
developments in state law tort actions to recover damages for
pesticide-related harms, notably the Supreme Court’s 2005
Bates decision, support the proposition that state law tort
actions may provide a vehicle to increase protection for
children’s health.
In order to accomplish this goal, environmental and
children’s nonprofit organizations should work more closely
with plaintiffs’ lawyers representing children in pesticide
exposure cases to present the best causation data available.
Moreover, where good data is not available, such groups can
help courts understand the nature of the scientific uncertainty
and encourage them to implement the precautionary principle
inherent in the FQPA. Plaintiffs can then argue that when
currently unavailable causation data could be reasonably
obtained, but the defendant has not conducted the testing to
obtain such data, the plaintiff has established its burden under
Daubert and the burden of proof on causation should be shifted
to the defendant.
In this way, the tort system can encourage positive
developments in testing, product availability, and regulation of
pesticides as they impact children’s health. This result can be
realized not only because the fear of lawsuits may spur
manufacturers to create safer and better products, as Justice
Stevens noted in Bates,267 but because lawsuits themselves can
raise public awareness of this important issue and influence
both manufacturers and policymakers to provide greater
protection to our nation’s children.

267. See Bates v. Dow Agrosciences LLC, 125 S. Ct. 1788, 1802 (2005).

